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Summary  
 
Overview 
 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was established in 2002 by the 
European Parliament and the Council on proposal form the European Commission to 
help rebuild consumer confidence in the safety of the food chain following a series of 
food scares in Europe during the 1990s. EFSA is responsible for giving sound 
independent scientific advice on all matters related to food and feed safety to support 
the development of future legislation and policies and for the provision of risk 
communication in all areas of its remit.  
 
This research was commissioned by EFSA to provide an independent critical review 
of the Authority‟s risk communication activities in relation to official opinions on the 
safety of foods in four cases: BSE in goats; wild and farmed fish; semicarbazide in 
baby food; and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). These cases were selected 
by EFSA for the focus of the review to reflect a variety of different communication 
contexts and challenges that the Authority faces in the course of its day-to-day work. 
Risk communication materials associated with these cases from July 2003 to March 
2008 were examined as part of the review.  
 
The review begins by providing an historical context to the issue of communicating 
food risk including an outline of some key issues typically associated with public 
responses to food risk issues such as the social amplification of risk, social distrust, 
and affect and emotion.  
 
In light of such considerations the review draws upon three fundamental principles for 
effectively communicating risk recently proposed by Fischhoff (2005) to develop a 
normative framework against which to appraise EFSA‟s risk communications. These 
principles concern: 1. creating appropriate risk communication channels; 2. the 
perceived credibility of EFSA‟s communications by other stakeholders; and 3. the 
efficient delivery of decision relevant information. 
 
Main Findings 
 
EFSA‟s risk communications were found to be generally well managed overall.  
EFSA is to be particularly commended for its proactive response to the discovery of 
potential food risks in the cases observed. Being open and transparent about potential 
food risks poses many difficulties, but EFSA seems to be rising to this challenge well. 
For example, it is noteworthy that EFSA both acknowledged and raised awareness of 
the countervailing risks potentially associated with behavioural choices that might 
possibly arise as a result of citizens being made aware of certain food risks as in the 
case of the semicarbazide discovery. This is indicative of a „sea-change‟ in 
organisational thinking and regulatory practice in Europe concerning risk 
communication since earlier food scandals such as BSE. In the event, EFSA appears 
to have succeeded in limiting the scope for potential media amplification of food risks 
associated with its communications. For example, the content of news media coverage 
was relatively proportionate and factual overall even in news articles which led with 
„alarming‟ headlines.  
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The review found there to be some variability in the level of communication used 
across each of the four cases studied with regard to the formulation and 
comprehensiveness of decision relevant information prepared for public dissemination 
for example. There was also found to be a degree of variability in the framing of 
communications between EFSA and other official stakeholders. For example, in 
relation to the discovery of BSE in a goat the European Commission was seen to be 
more reassuring than EFSA. Similarly, in the semicarbazide case the UK Food Safety 
Authority was also perceived to have adopted a tone that was more concerning to 
consumers than in EFSA‟s communications. In this case EFSA‟s communications 
were distinguished by a focus on the countervailing risks of microbial contamination 
that might occur from other forms of food processing and packaging in the home as 
well as stressing the fact that any industry substitutes to semicarbazide should be 
carefully tested before market introduction.   
 
For the most part EFSA‟s credibility was not publicly drawn into question except with 
specific regard to the GMO case. Here NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth criticised the independence of the Authority and the quality and 
comprehensiveness of scientific risk assessments. These stakeholders also appear to 
have conflated EFSA‟s role in the risk management of GM food within Europe. The 
steadfast refusal of some Member States to lift national moratoriums on GMOs may 
also have lent support to notions that EFSA had not sufficiently taken all health and 
environmental risk concerns into consideration in initial Scientific Panel Opinions.   
 
As with any review it is always possible to say with hindsight that EFSA might have 
done more to address such issues than at the time. For instance, EFSA could have 
initially shown more initiative in opening public and stakeholder consultations soon 
after the Authority was first created particularly as EFSA has since responded by 
putting more consultative measures in place to foster dialogue between different 
stakeholders on this controversial topic. As some of these consultation activities came 
later in EFSA‟s operation it may be perceived that the Authority had to resort to 
reactive measures to address public criticism rather than being a more willing partner 
in addressing broader concerns from the start. However, it should also be recognised 
that whilst imperatives for greater openness and dialogue may enhance substantive 
discussions on such matters, these also needed to be balanced against a primary 
objective of EFSA to maintain independence from political debate and influence at 
the risk assessment/risk management interface. In these respects EFSA has since 
undertaken a number of initiatives to strengthen policy regarding the declaration of 
interests of EFSAs members and the evaluation of the quality of EFSA‟s scientific 
work. 
  
Key Recommendations  
 
Following these findings a number of constructive recommendations are made to help 
EFSA to further professionalize their risk communication activities. In particular it is 
suggested that EFSA should be more mindful of the risk communication needs of all 
of the Authority‟s publics. As EFSA relies quite heavily on the media for its public 
communications it is recommended that the Authority work in conjunction with 
members of the media to develop criteria for reporting food risks that will help in the 
efficient and effective delivery of decision relevant information to consumers. EFSA 
should also continue to impress upon its members the need for maintaining a 
proactive approach to risk communication on potentially controversial issues such as 
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with GMOs. That is to say, EFSA needs to remain vigilant in the face of potential 
social and political ramifications that may come to light, as well as scientific 
considerations, when dealing with emerging food risks. This might also require that 
the Authority restates its role in the risk assessment/risk management interface. 
Finally, it is suggested that EFSA may benefit from formalising internal protocols to 
ensure consistently high levels of communication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 6 - 
 
1. Introduction and objectives 
 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was established in 2002 by the 
European Parliament and the Council on proposal from the European Commission to 
help rebuild consumer confidence in the safety of the food chain following a series of 
food scandals in Europe such as the Belgian dioxin scare and the Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalitis (BSE) „mad cow‟ crisis during the 1990s. EFSA is responsible for giving 
objective independent scientific advice on all matters relating to food and feed safety 
to support the development of legislation and policies and for the provision of risk 
communication in all areas of its remit. The King‟s Centre for Risk Management, 
King‟s College London, was commissioned by EFSA to undertake an independent 
critical review of the organisation‟s risk communication activities in relation to 
official opinions on the safety of foods in four cases: Genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), the safety of wild and farmed fish (SWAFF), BSE in goats, and the 
discovery of semicarbazide in food
1
. The aims of the review were threefold: first, 
using the risk communication and perception literatures, to technically appraise and 
compare EFSA‟s written output associated with the above four cases along with that 
of other relevant actors; second, to analyse which actors with regard to these cases 
were most successful in communicating risks and why; and third, based on this 
information to provide EFSA with constructive feedback to further professionalize the 
organisation‟s risk communication activities by identifying possible improvements of 
the technical and ethical character of EFSA‟s approach to risk communication.  
 
The review starts by first briefly highlighting some of the critical issues identified in 
by prior research to shape the effectiveness of organisational risk communication 
efforts. The next section of the review provides an outline of contemporary academic 
thinking and best practice about how to proceed in light of such considerations. 
Insights are derived from this work and integrated into the technical review in the 
form of normative appraisal criteria against which descriptive observations of EFSA‟s 
risk communication activities are evaluated in view of other stakeholder 
communications and wider news media coverage. EFSA‟s risk communication 
activities for each of the four cases are presented and analysed in turn and the review 
concludes by providing some prescriptive recommendations for communicating food 
risks following the particular challenges and objectives exemplified in the four cases 
studied. 
 
2. Critical issues for food risk communication 
 
Despite the emergence and growth of risk research in environmental and technological 
fields perhaps somewhat surprisingly until some ten or twelve years ago comparatively 
little academic research had been undertaken on the provision and impact of 
organisational risk communication in  the area of food risks (see Lofstedt 2006 for a 
recent review). Fortunately, risk communication researchers both from within and 
outside the food area have since begun to carry out a number of interesting case studies 
to shed further light on this topic. This work has focused particularly on public 
                                                 
1
 This was a desk research project focussing primarily on written communication materials and so no 
stakeholders or policy makers were interviewed. The four cases were selected specifically at the 
request of EFSA to reflect a variety of the different types of communication issues and demands placed 
upon the Authority. Risk communication materials examined from July 2003 to March 2008. 
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perception and acceptance of genetically modified foods (GMOs) (e.g. Blaine and 
Powell 2000; Fischhoff and Fischhoff 2001; Finucane 2002; Frewer et al 1997; Frewer 
et al 1998; Frewer and Shepherd 1994; Gaskell et al 1998; 2000; 2003; 2004; Grove-
White et al 1997; Leiss 2001; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2005; Siegrist 2000; Walls et al 
2005) and the communication of scientific uncertainty (Frewer et al 2002 and 2003; 
Miles and Frewer 2003).  In addition, there has been a proliferation of studies examining 
and analysing the communication of science, risk and uncertainty surrounding the BSE 
crisis that affected the UK in particular, but also the rest of Europe in the mid 1990s and 
afterwards (e.g. Anand and Forshner 1995; Eldridge et al 1998; Fischler 2001; Powell 
and Leiss 1997; Setbon et al 2005). The intention here is not to provide a comprehensive 
review of this and other research for reasons of limited space, but instead to highlight 
certain points that this research has indicated are important considerations when 
approaching the issue of food risk communication.  
 
2.1 Early psychometric research on food risks  
 
The focus of early attempts by researchers and government agencies to address the issue 
of food risk communication followed the methods and insights generated by the 
„psychometric paradigm‟ first depicted in work by Fischhoff and Slovic and colleagues 
in relation to public risk perceptions of hazards in general (see Fischhoff et al. 1978; 
Slovic et al. 1980). This pivotal research built upon the seminal work of Chauncey Starr 
(1969) and analysed the way in which people appraise and evaluate risks for themselves. 
It suggested that people‟s risk preferences or acceptance of risk reflected not so much 
expert assessments of the likelihood and severity of harm from a hazard as revealed for 
example through actuarial data, but rather that people‟s risk perceptions of potential 
hazards are multidimensional and complex being related to two primary factors in 
particular commonly referred to as „dread risk‟ and „unknown risk‟ (Slovic 2000; but 
see Hohl and Gaskell 2008). The risks that are most „dreaded‟ tend to be those which 
seem to be uncontrollable, entail fatal consequences, have high catastrophic potential 
and are manmade rather than naturally occurring. Risk concerns loading on the 
„unknown‟ factor reflect that the effects may be unobservable, delayed, unfamiliar or 
novel or if they are not fully recognised and understood by science.  
 
Measuring people‟s perceptions of risk following the psychometric approach was thus 
thought to help an observer to develop an overall perceptual „snapshot‟ of the 
particular risk in question that may in turn then be used to help an organisation 
anticipate the likely public reaction at that specific point in time. However, as the 
early psychometric researchers believed that a particular set of hazards under study 
might have an important impact on the observed dimensions of perceived risk, 
subsequent research has attempted to study individual hazard domains separately. 
This led to a number of research studies in the mid-1990s focussing more specifically 
on the domain of food risks (see for example Fife-Schaw and Rowe 1996; Sparks and 
Shepherd 1994). Food risk researchers were notably concerned that there were a 
number of a priori reasons to expect that factors developed to explain perceptions of 
large scale hazards (such as nuclear power plants) may not be readily applicable in the 
case of food risks, with Fife-Schaw and Rowe (1996) observing for example that: 
 
- people are dependent on food more so than for many other potential hazards 
- there is often individual choice when it comes to eating which depends more 
on personal relationships and experience than say government agencies 
- many food choices are habitual and often have immediate and obvious benefits  
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- whilst some negative consequences (such as mild food poisoning) are 
encountered they can be small or go unnoticed, and so eating is not generally 
perceived as hazardous except in times of food scares as compared to other 
types of risks for which risk perceptions may be more sustained  
 
This later research also attempted to overcome some of the methodological drawbacks 
of some previous psychometric studies by eliciting the structure of risk perceptions 
from focus group respondents rather then simply imposing a structure derived by the 
researchers themselves. In fact, the findings of these studies proved to be 
comparatively similar to those of prior psychometric research suggesting that the key 
dimensions previously observed for other risk domains were also broadly 
generalisable to the domain of food risk (Fife-Schaw and Rowe 1996; Sparks and 
Shepherd 1994). Interestingly, Fife-Schaw and Rowe (1996) further found that food 
risks that were perceived as unknown (i.e. not being previously encountered or the 
subject of prior risk communications) were still regarded by respondents as serious 
and in need of regulation, and that this may represent a default, or starting position for 
many food risks first entering public awareness.  
  
Yet, despite the instructive insights generated by psychometric studies, other authors as 
well as the originators of this research have also pointed to the fact that individual risk 
perceptions are situated in a broader social and cultural context that influences how 
people generally encounter and (re)construct risk information. Psychometric studies only 
give a partial insight into how people subsequently appraise and give meaning to this 
information and incorporate it into the decisions they make affecting their day-to-day 
lives. Understanding these processes in relation to individual perceptions of food risks 
therefore also requires a more in-depth focus on some of the factors that make food risk 
communication issues particularly unique.  
 
Elaborating from this perspective researchers have highlighted that not only is food 
required for life and survival so we as humans cannot escape it, but that it figures both 
materially and symbolically in our consumption practices; hence it is no surprise that 
food can become structurally associated with deeply rooted anxieties and shifting 
configurations of personal and social identity (Kjaernes et al 2003; see also Fischler 
1988; Kjaernes 1999; Reith 2004). Moreover, Reith (2004) has further remarked upon 
how consumerism and socio-historical processes of governance and control within 
advanced neo-liberal societies can give rise to deep social tensions over patterns of 
consumption. For instance, food consumption practices and the social discourses that 
surround them are notably dynamic and inherently contradictory as food consumption is 
framed not only by notions of liberty, individual freedom and choice, but also 
increasingly by a sense of personal and social restraint and responsibility not only for 
one‟s own health and the health of others but also the environment and animal welfare. 
Such framings are not at once entirely compatible with one another and may often lead 
to social friction. In other work, Renn (2006) has recently observed that public 
understandings of the complexity of exposure to risk, uncertainty about the actual 
occurrence of presumed effects, and the resulting ambiguity that arises when these 
effects are evaluated differently by different social actors all pose special challenges to 
the communication of food risks.  
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2.2 The social amplification of risk 
 
One attempt to situate the insights gained from risk perception studies within the 
context of broader social interaction and communication has centred on the 
development of a conceptual framework known as the „social amplification of risk‟ 
(see Kasperson et al 1988), which has recently been applied by several researchers to 
analyse food risk communication (see for example several contributions to the 
volumes by Pidgeon et al. 2003 and Flynn et al. 2001). The first proponents of this 
framework attempted to conceptually model how hazard events or accidents 
(characterised for example by such qualities as „dread‟ and „uncertainty‟ indicated in 
psychometric studies) act as „signals‟ giving rise to ripple effects that may extend 
beyond any damage or harm encountered directly and immediately to encompass 
many other victims. According to these authors social interactions between agents 
such as government officials, non-state actors and NGOs, the mass media and 
members of the public may serve to amplify (or attenuate) the psychological, social, 
physical and economic impacts of a risk incident. These outcomes arise as part of the 
general ongoing process of communication and exchange of information between the 
members of a society and can lead to detrimental effects such as the generation of 
stigma, which may last not only over the immediate term, but also much longer over 
time.  
 
The social amplification of risk clearly affected modern European food scandals, most 
especially in the case of the BSE crisis which is regarded by several academics as a 
„textbook example‟ of social amplification of risk at work (see Kasperson et al. 2001; 
Setbon et al. 2005; Flynn et al. 2002). In this case, the social amplification of risk led 
to the stigmatising of food and food production as well as food producers which 
severely impacted on national economies. Furthermore, as government agencies and 
public health authorities were also widely perceived to be negligent in their duty to 
protect the health of European citizens, this had lasting ramifications for consumer 
trust and confidence in the safety of the food supply chain that are still felt today 
(Frewer 2003; Eldridge and Reilly 2003).  
 
2.3 Trust and transparency 
 
Of the many variables that influence how the public perceives risk, public trust is 
arguably one of the most important (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2005; Lofstedt 2005; Slovic 
1993; Siegrist 2000). Past research has shown a relationship between high public trust 
and low public perceived risk and low public trust and high public perceived risk and 
that once lost trust is difficult to regain (Slovic 1993). Moreover, if a highly trusted 
stakeholder publicly speaks out against a low trusted public body then public opinion 
more often tends to follow the more highly trusted party. However, if a stakeholder with 
low trust criticises a highly trusted public body then the more highly trusted party is 
more likely to retain credibility in the eyes of the public (Lofstedt 2005).  
 
In the fall out after recent European food scandals it is generally regarded that an era of 
heightened distrust has emerged whereby the public have turned away from risk 
regulators and public health authorities to other sources of health risk information 
believed in many cases, however rightly or wrongly, to be more accurate and reliable 
than official sources. It is little surprise therefore that under the scrutiny of a 24/7 
hyperbolic media environment in which various stakeholders numerously compete with 
official sources to promote their own points of view on food risk issues that many 
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regulators, government agencies, and public health authorities have thus placed a high 
premium on achieving and maintaining high public trust in risk debates. 
 
One popular method for addressing public distrust of official health authorities has been 
to open up institutions to greater transparency. Transparency has long been regarded as a 
key component to modern democracy and public service reform more generally and has 
recently been seen as an antidote to distrust by helping to prevent secrecy and to promote 
public accountability (Hood et al. 2006). Indeed, the issue of wider transparency in 
policy making is in the eyes of many policy makers crucial to rebuilding public trust 
(European Commission 2001). But despite the received wisdom of this view increasing 
transparency is not a problem free process and a number of problems have arisen when 
transparency has been applied uncritically. Demands for greater transparency may for 
example generate scientific pluralism if scientists „go public‟ with new findings leaving 
little time for official organisations to formulate policy responses which may lead to 
policy vacuums (Lofstedt 2004; Jasanoff 1990).  
 
The growth in public transparency of governmental and private organisations can also 
result in information overload for recipients. The act of simply providing more 
information does not necessarily lead to greater understanding or promote public trust in 
institutions because to place trust people also need the means by which to be capable to 
judge the basis of new information (O‟Neill 2002). According to O‟Neill (2002) the full 
disclosure of information can actually lead to further uncertainty unless that information 
is sorted and assessed, but unless those institutions responsible for sorting and assessing 
information are already trusted there is little reason to suppose that transparency and 
openness are going to increase trust. Rather, O‟Neill (2002) further argues that excessive 
demands for public transparency can in fact encourage people within organisations to be 
less honest or forthright and to underplay sensitive information resulting in self-
censorship; the problem being that although transparency may limit secrecy in part it 
does not necessarily destroy deception or misinformation. In which case, it may be in the 
reasonable interests of outside observers to withhold their trust even when organisations 
have transparency policies in place.  
 
Although transparency is plainly not a panacea for problems of distrust there are some 
grounds to suggest that it can be a useful risk management tool if deployed critically to 
support people‟s decision making. One object lesson to be learned from risk 
management crises over the past few decades is that unnecessary delays in the provision 
of information leading to communication vacuums, communicating risk in a restrictive 
„one-way‟ fashion and attempting to cover-up facts about what may have happened are 
actions that are most likely to alienate concerned citizens, cause public distrust and 
deficits in the perceived credibility of government and official agencies (Powell and 
Leiss 1997; Lofstedt 2005). However, as O‟Neill (2002) rightly observes greater 
transparency in the form of a flood of un-checkable information provided via one-way 
modes of communication is unlikely to deliver gains in public trust; rather what is 
needed is a means by which people can scrutinise the information they need and check 
the credentials of information sources for themselves. Practitioners are therefore rather 
better advised to spend their time proactively preparing risk communications that are 
responsive to the information needs of concerned citizens (see Powell and Leiss 1997).  
 
This means that official authorities may need to make available information on request 
as needed to be opened up to public scrutiny, but should not constantly flood recipients 
with vast streams of information concerning the minutiae of an organisation‟s risk-
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related practices, procedures and decision outcomes. As a general rule it seems that the 
greater the ambiguity that pervades social risk discourses (often resulting from high 
levels of complexity and scientific uncertainty) then the greater the requirement in 
democratic societies for organisations to foster more open and transparent public 
dialogue about the risk in question (Klinke and Renn 2002). The capability of people to 
critically appraise risk information when sufficiently motivated should not be 
underestimated. Making available and accessible information about the basis, rationale 
and philosophies of institutional viewpoints and decisions even in the context of 
alternatives is a form of transparency that people can usefully employ to make better 
informed decisions. Research by White and Eiser (2005) has indicated for example that 
information about an organisation‟s policies towards managing risk can improve trust in 
that organisation by allowing people some insight into the organisation‟s general outlook 
and performance rather than just for a specific incident. Ultimately though, public trust 
seems likely only to be built up incrementally. That is to say, when starting from a 
position of distrust, the reliability of information sources can only be critically judged 
based on the merits of the utility of the information they provide and their performance 
over time before individuals can suitably judge whether or not they would be well 
advised to withhold their trust in such sources presently or again in future.     
 
2.4. Affect, perceived benefits and fundamental objections to food risks 
 
The maintenance of public trust, though important, is not however the whole story with 
regard to understanding how people will respond to information about potential risks. 
The perceptions of people within an extended audience will typically be heterogeneous 
and reflect a variety of outlooks, interests and experiences. This makes the problem of 
differentiating, prioritising and targeting risk communication efforts a seemingly arduous 
and resource intensive task. People‟s perceptions of risk can be heightened or attenuated 
by a variety of contingent factors and psychological processes, but not necessarily in 
equal measure across different subgroups or cultures (Fischler 2001).  
 
Research has recently re-emphasized that the effectiveness of risk communication 
messages in influencing consumer judgements about food can in fact be offset by 
perceptions of the food‟s benefits as well as values about science and society rather than 
„lay‟ understandings of risk or public trust in authorities per se (see Gaskell et al. 2005). 
For example, experimental demonstrations of the „affect-heuristic‟ by Paul Slovic and 
Mellissa Finucane and colleagues (2000; 2004) have shown that if individuals initially 
perceive the introduction of a new technology to have low benefits then they are also 
more likely naturally to infer that the risk of that technology is high; and vice versa, that 
if the risks are initially perceived to be high that the benefits of a new technology are 
accordingly assumed to be low. Similarly, work by Gaskell (2004) and colleagues 
(Gaskell et al. 2005) in an applied context suggests that a lack of public support for 
GMOs may be most attributable to general perceptions of low benefits to consumers 
from the introduction of this new technology. In sum, people may rightly raise the 
question as to why they should accept a potential risk if there are not obvious benefits to 
them for doing so. Gaskell and colleagues note that this poses a particular problem 
because considerations of the potential benefits of controversial new food technologies 
such as GMOs rarely figure in conventional risk communication messages by health 
authorities and agencies despite the prevalence of such concerns in wider social and 
political discourses about their introduction and use.  
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The different facets of what might be termed as the „perceived benefit problem‟ may 
thus pose a particular difficulty for food safety authorities. The logical conclusion for 
risk communication practitioners might be to include more information about potential 
benefits to further offset the instrumental risk-benefit tradeoffs that people make about 
new technologies such as GMOs. Some recent research has advocated for example that 
healthier food consumption practices could be promoted by using attractive images to 
point out the benefits of behavioural changes (Simons and Lehnsch 2006). But where 
food safety authorities do tend to comment on the particular benefits of food in their 
communications this would typically be confined to a consideration of the nutritional 
value of food on its own or in relation to other foods, or perhaps a food‟s comparative 
safety being seen as a benefit. Any wider benefits to other actors in society at large such 
as commercial benefits through more efficient production methods or higher crop yields 
for food producers tend not to feature. These latter concerns which may be taken up by 
industry advocates are generally of a far less direct importance to consumers except 
perhaps with regards to their potential impact on food pricing which could have an 
influence on consumer intentions to purchase GM foods for example (see Moon and 
Balasubramanian 2003; Spence and Townsend 2006).   
 
However, people‟s perceptions of risk may not directly correspond to positive 
information even when it is transmitted (Joffe 2003). Gaskell et al. (1999) have found for 
example that although European press coverage of biotechnology was more positive than 
that of North American press coverage, European public opinion was much more 
negative. As Fischhoff and Fischhoff (2001) have forewarned many novel technologies 
also raise fundamental objections whereby any potential risks are thought to be 
unacceptable because it is deemed morally or ethically wrong to incur them. 
Fundamental objections may be exacerbated by a technology having acquired a 
stigmatised status through inferential processes and social interactions (as in the case of 
the social amplification of risk noted above), or may be determined by individual tastes 
or social norms and cultural taboos (see for example Douglas 1992; Fischhoff and 
Fischhoff 2001). This may have in fact been the case for European public opinion, for 
which GM food was more readily associated with images of adulteration, infection, 
monster-qualities and menace than the North American public opinion (Gaskell et al. 
1999; see also Tait 2001). In such instances, no instrumental benefits could possibly 
compensate for having to countenance those risks as part of every day living.  
 
For some public health authority officials risk communication might arguably be utilised 
or tailored to address people‟s instrumental concerns about the potential risks of a 
particular food substance or food production technology. However, the issue of formally 
addressing the fundamental concerns that people might have is considerably more 
problematic. This is because attempts to manipulate affective responses by engaging in 
stigma reduction strategies for example, or trying to change cultural norms, practices and 
outlooks towards science or food consumption inevitably means taking sides in wider 
ethical and political struggles (Fischoff 2001). In practice, these types of activities are 
often seen to be beyond the scope of many publicly appointed authorities whose remit 
generally requires them to maintain independence and objectivity on such matters. In 
many instances the risk assessment and management activities of food safety authorities 
have in fact been purposely separated as a means to partial out political and social 
influence from official positions on risk in a bid to increase the credibility of risk 
assessments in the eyes of the public. Furthermore, food safety authorities are notably 
only one link in a chain of actors that play a part in broader individual, social, cultural 
and political processes which impact on food consumption practices. It should therefore 
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be acknowledged that there are limits to the kind of influence they are able to exert on 
the social acceptability and desirability of different policy options in their assigned role.  
 
The findings generated by the body of work outlined above therefore highlight many of 
the inherent contextual complexities and difficulties associated with the issue of 
communicating food risk. These concerns consequently raise key questions about what 
the fundamental objectives of organisational risk communication might be and the kind 
of activities it should fully encompass. These considerations are the focus of the next 
section of this review. 
 
3. A modern approach to organisational risk communication 
 
Many government agencies and official authorities now acknowledge that risk 
communication has an important role to play in helping to safeguard citizens‟ health 
and the environment as well as promoting informed debate and choice about risk. This 
review now turns to the question of specifying what objectives and what form the 
provision of organisational risk communication might actually entail. To this end, it is 
proposed that Baruch Fischhoff (2006) has recently put forward a conceptual scheme 
which succinctly captures modern thinking on the objectives and effective 
implementation of risk communication. This scheme centres on three interrelated 
principles: create appropriate communication channels; manage risks well so as to 
have a credible message to communicate; and deliver decision relevant information 
concisely and comprehensibly. The particular advantage of this scheme is that it 
adopts a pragmatic focus which articulates some of the main objectives that must be 
set and the fundamental conditions that must be fostered in order to communicate risk 
effectively. However, by acknowledging the interactive nature of these fundamental 
conditions this scheme emphasises that effective risk communication must be viewed as 
a multi-dimensional enterprise. That is to say, the three fundamental principles of this 
scheme must be considered in concert: focussing on either one at the expense of the 
other two is likely to hinder the effectiveness of risk communication efforts. These 
objectives are next elaborated upon in turn as each is operationalised in the form of 
evaluative criteria for this review. The elaboration of these criteria subsequently 
largely draws upon a body of work conducted by Baruch Fischhoff and colleagues 
that has contributed to the development of this scheme, as well as insights generated 
by other researchers within the risk communication field which are seen as 
complementary to this adopted approach. 
 
 
3.1. Creating appropriate risk communication channels 
 
First it is helpful here to elaborate upon how the notion of risk communication is 
contemporarily coming to be understood by academics and policy makers as a social 
process. Risk communication in its most general sense is perhaps best described as: 
 
“The flow of information and risk evaluations back and forth between academic 
experts, regulatory practitioners, interest groups, and the general public” (Leiss 
1996, p. 86).   
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Or as stated in CODEX:  
 
“The interactive exchange of information and opinions concerning risk among 
risk assessors, risk managers and other interested parties.” 
 
These descriptions are notable in reflecting the conventional wisdom that risk 
communication should not be construed asymmetrically as simply a „one-way‟ form of 
communication from organisations to the lay public. In one-way communication 
authority officials commonly subscribe to the „deficit model‟ of the public. In this model 
the public is typically considered to be deficient in their knowledge about a particular 
issue and that this needs to be remedied through disseminating more information or 
publicising official viewpoints derived from „experts‟. From this perspective risk 
communication failure is conceived as a disruption or breakdown in the transmission of 
risk messages from authorities or more often the miscoding of that information by its 
recipients. Where there is public doubt or scepticism over risk information this is 
typically attributed to the public‟s ignorance, scientific illiteracy, or irrationality (Sturgis 
and Allum 2004). However, as scholars such as Fischhoff (2006) and Powell and Leiss 
(1997) contend, one-way communication generates the impression that recipients are 
being managed, learning no more than an authority wants them to know, and as such 
these actions can thus result in alienating intended recipients of communications.  
 
The two definitions of risk communication outlined above instead highlight rather the 
contextual nature of communication. From this viewpoint, organisational risk 
communication necessarily constitutes part of a broader „two-way‟ engagement in social 
and political discourse including all those who become involved in a risk issue. In two-
way communication, actors are regarded equally and recipients are treated like partners 
allowing them greater responsibility to shape how risks are managed and share what is 
learned about them (Fischhoff 2006). As such, public health and safety authorities are 
involved in a much more dynamic process of sharing information between all active 
parties who interpret and reinterpret that information in accordance with personal goals 
and contexts. Organisations thus not only have to be responsive to how others engage 
with their communications, they also need to be responsive to communications by other 
stakeholders whom might have different information needs and perspectives or insights 
to offer.  
 
In practice, the day-to-day provision of risk communication by organisations 
encompasses a wide variety of modes and formats. These may range from the 
dissemination and sharing of information about risks through websites and press releases 
for example, to more consultative methods such as public/stakeholder meetings or 
dialogue and inclusive forms of deliberative decision making and „upstream 
engagement‟ (see for example Wilsden et al. 2005). Recent risk communication research 
has indicated and largely supported a general trend towards facilitating dialogue and 
stakeholder involvement in risk decision making. These latter formats involve 
stakeholders from a cross-section of interests early and directly in helping to set risk 
management policies, priorities and agendas. However, contrary to popular and political 
opinion, engaging in dialogue though often important and essential to the policy-making 
process is not problem free and can be difficult to implement so it should not be taken 
for granted as a „be-all and end-all‟ solution to the issue of effective risk communication 
(Lofstedt 2005; Fischhoff 1995).  
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Aside from the complications associated with uncritically widening transparency and 
information overload identified above, one further problem with facilitating public 
consultation exercises or deliberative dialogue is that it is often difficult to secure a 
broadly representative selection of people‟s views. Debates about risk can therefore 
sometimes become narrowly skewed by the sectional interests of groups or individuals 
with their own particular biases or political agendas. Work by Townsend and Campbell 
(2004) has argued for example that popular opinions of GM technology may be more 
ambivalent than was represented in the GMNation? public debate, a major consultative 
exercise recently held in the UK which found many who participated to be sceptical of 
GM technology. Some recent case studies have also indicated that public trust in risk 
managers should be considered when deciding whether to embark on public consultation 
programmes. For example, if the outcomes of risk management initiatives are likely 
found to be unfair to those affected it is important to include and represent a broader 
section of interests in risk management decisions.  
 
On the other hand, if decisions are initially trusted and seen as representative of the 
public interest then people may question the rationale behind why they are being 
informed about particular decisions or being asked to become involved. There is a 
concern therefore that this could in fact lead to cynicism about an organisation‟s genuine 
intentions for publicising risk assessment findings or presenting particular risk 
management options for example, in which case a „top-down‟ approach might seemingly 
have better sufficed (see Lofstedt 2005). Lofstedt (2005) has accordingly advised that the 
context of public trust should be tested for on a case-by-case basis to help determine the 
form and scale of public involvement. Klinke and Renn (2002) have also argued that 
social ambiguity rather than say the complexity or scientific uncertainty associated with 
a particular risk is a key condition for actively attempting to engage different 
stakeholders and the lay public in risk dialogue. Scientific uncertainty alone may instead 
require that further discourse and deliberation be undertaken between experts and may 
be better communicated once a policy option or response has been formulated to address 
that uncertainty (Frewer et al. 2002).  
 
Officials in government organisations and agencies are therefore coming to recognise 
that there is no „one-size-fits-all‟ policy solution to risk communication problems. 
Rather, understanding the nuances of different risk assessment, management and 
appraisal contexts and faithfully implementing risk communication practices appropriate 
to those contexts is essential to the effective functioning of authorities charged with 
responsibility for addressing food risk issues. Therefore, whilst it is advisable for an 
organisation to employ a common framework to underpin the preparation of coordinated 
and well executed communication plans, to ensure that appropriate communication 
channels are opened organisations also need to adopt a flexible approach. This means 
regularly working with different stakeholders on different communication platforms not 
only to help ensure the dissemination of information to target recipients, but also to 
increase the sufficiency of opportunities for feedback, input and comment from other 
stakeholders and the public where appropriate.   
 
 
Summary Box 1. Creating appropriate channels 
- „two-way‟ not „one-way‟ communication 
- risk communication operationalised as a framework for learning in the face of 
uncertainty  
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- openness and transparency can be helpful if applied responsively, but are not a 
panacea to problems of distrust or ensuring informed decision making 
- proactive avoidance of communication vacuums 
- identify the context of communications and how stakeholders engage with 
your communications 
- be attentive to risk management and appraisal context, levels of public and 
participatory dialogue may need to be responsive to public trust and social 
ambiguity 
- work with a variety of stakeholders and incorporate a range of different 
communication platforms to facilitate appropriate levels of media/stakeholder 
coverage, interest, uptake and input 
 
 
3.2. The credibility of organisational decisions  
 
Renn (2003) has recently forewarned that the enthusiasm for improving risk 
communication procedures, as seen by the popularity associated with concepts such as 
two-way communication, trust-building and citizen participation should not, however, 
obscure the challenge of how practitioners can put such noble goals into practice or how 
to ensure that risk management reflects competence, efficiency and fair burden sharing. 
That is to say, any communication about an organisation‟s activities also has to be 
preceded by credible decisions and practices by that organisation and so the attainment 
of credibility in the eyes of other stakeholders and the public has therefore become a 
paramount objective for organisations. The issue of credibility should not however, 
become a „catch-all‟ notion for everything that can possibly go wrong in 
organisational risk communication
2
. Furthermore, it should be noted that it is not 
within the remit of this review to assess the actual substantive basis for EFSA‟s 
credibility per se. Rather, credibility as operationalised in this review refers to how the 
conduct of an organisation is publicly perceived in terms of the competence, efficiency 
and fairness/independence of organisational decisions and practices (Lofstedt 2005; 
Renn and Levine 1991). For EFSA this includes inquiry into how the Authority has been 
socially represented by other stakeholders and in the media in terms of how the 
assessment and communication of risk have been conducted and the value of this 
contribution to the improvement of broader food risk management goals in Europe, both 
in relation to the four case studies selected and more generally.  
 
To elaborate a little further on these points, competence is generally regarded in terms 
of the proficiency and expertise of the organisational actors in question which may be 
based on the reputation of those involved and is commonly assessed by public 
perception of past performances. If risks have been poorly assessed or managed and if 
policies seem inconsistent then it may prompt scepticism and prove difficult for 
organisations to inspire confidence, in which case the credibility of communications 
will suffer (Fischhoff 2006). Where the competence of decision makers is brought 
into question an organisation may need to expend further effort to explain or make 
transparent the rationale behind certain organisational decisions and procedures. 
Otherwise the organisation may have to recruit highly respected experts seen to be 
more capable of fulfilling the role in question.  
 
                                                 
2
 We thank Baruch Fischhoff for highlighting this point. 
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Independence and fairness are also important elements of the credibility of risk 
management decisions. This may be conceived in terms of the impartiality of the 
decision making procedure itself or the fair distribution of outcomes resulting from 
the process in view of whether the decision makers took everyone‟s interests into 
account or just those of certain powerful industry bodies for example (Lofstedt 2005; 
Renn and Levine 1995). If it is believed that authorities have not acted independently, 
by putting sectional interests ahead of those of the public then this will undermine 
communications which may become regarded essentially as „spin‟ rather than as 
providing an important public service (Fischhoff 2006).  
 
Effectively deciding how to best manage and communicate risk in the interests of 
different sections of society with different expectations and preferences is clearly a 
difficult balancing act for many public health and safety authorities with only finite 
resources available at their disposal. For example, on the one hand, food safety 
authorities are seen to carry responsibility for diligently providing information about 
potential food risks to help safeguard consumers‟ health, and the failure to provide 
such information may not only adversely affect consumers it can also irreparably 
damage an authority‟s reputation and credibility. This has been shown by the results 
of poor communication in the recent history of European food scandals such as BSE, 
Foot and Mouth and the Belgian Dioxin scare (Loftsedt 2006). On the other hand, in 
providing such information food safety authorities are increasingly known to face 
accusations of unduly inundating consumers with an almost daily stream of 
information about food risks, or unnecessarily amplifying public anxieties by 
manufacturing health scares out of every new risk assessment conducted by health 
and safety authorities (see Renn 2006).  History has thus generally shown that in 
plural societies there will always be critics on either side of any risk debate, even 
debates about the correct provision of risk communication. Therefore, sustained 
accusations of the kind above might arguably undermine the effectiveness of future 
communication efforts, but most especially if validated by the actions of the 
authorities concerned themselves.  
 
To maintain the public‟s attention an organisation therefore needs to use, and be seen 
as using not only their own time and resources efficiently and effectively, but also the 
time and resources of those targeted by communications (Lofstedt 2005; Fischhoff 
1998). In the first case it is important that authority initiatives reflect an efficient 
allocation of financial resources as people do not want to see taxpayers‟ money 
wasted or squandered on ineffective or inappropriate actions. At the same time the 
most efficient allocation of public spending as defined by economists (e.g. 
maximising aggregate net benefits and least net aggregate cost to society, or the 
number of lives saved by £1 million of monetary spending on „x‟ activity verses the 
number of lives saved by £1 million monetary spending on „y‟ activity) may not 
reflect public priorities for reasons other than economic efficiency, particularly with 
respect to how those initiatives directly affect individual choices and actions (Graham 
and Weiner 1995). Whereas it may be paramount to economists for the financial costs 
of a proposed action to be reasonably weighted against the degree of risk reduction, it 
may seem arbitrary or inappropriate to the public if decision makers rationalise 
actions such as whether to spend money protecting the environment versus saving 
lives according to how each activity may be valued in monetary terms. Public 
concerns expressed over such issues are likely to figure more acutely during times of 
economic hardship or depression, but should not be ignored at other times (Lofstedt 
2005).  
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With respect to the second concern, health authorities must be seen to be using 
people‟s time efficiently. On the one hand this can be achieved by ensuring that 
communications are timely and provide the most decision relevant information as 
demanded sufficient to meet citizen‟s information needs as a particular risk situation 
evolves and people‟s thoughts and feelings of that situation evolve with it (Fischhoff 
2006). Reporting well known facts or irrelevant ones whilst ignoring topics that 
people wish to understand better can be seen as wasting time by testing both the 
patience and concentration of the target audience (Fischhoff 1998). On the other hand 
official authorities need to be active listeners: misunderstanding or being perceived to 
be ignoring the concerns and wishes of others can alienate intended partners in 
communication. Some of the main tasks involved in providing and eliciting decision 
relevant information concisely and comprehensibly are subsequently the focus of the 
next section. 
 
Summary Box 2. Credibility  
- organisation is perceived to be competent and proficient 
- decision processes and outcomes perceived to be fair and impartial 
- resources for handling risk perceived to be allocated efficiently within the 
bounds of public priorities and values 
- provide communications which are a timely and efficient use of recipient‟s 
time 
- organisation is an active listener, sensitive to the concerns and wishes of 
communication partners 
 
 
3.3 Delivering decision relevant information concisely and comprehensibly 
 
Following Fischhoff (2006), a third fundamental principle of effective risk 
communication is to provide decision-relevant information, concisely and 
comprehensibly to support substantive improvements in understanding and decision 
making. One methodology that has been put forward as a way of ideally helping 
institutions to meet this objective is known as the „mental models approach‟. This 
approach involves rigorous analysis of the facts that citizens need to know in order to 
make the choices facing them, followed by empirical study of what they already 
know, and then the design, implementation and evaluation of communications to 
bridge critical gaps (see Bostrom et al 1992/3; Morgan et al. 2001). Many 
organisations responsible for improving the health and safety of citizens are often 
quite willing and able to determine what they conceive to be the facts that citizens 
most need to know where for example they have access to new risk assessment 
findings and scientific expertise. Unfortunately they equally often tend to have less an 
idea of how to communicate that information and are generally less likely to make the 
effort required to determine what people already know, let alone evaluate any 
achievements at bridging critical gaps in that knowledge (see Chess et al. 1995). By 
the same token, such organisations also often fail to see risk communication as a way 
to bridge critical gaps in their own knowledge leading to restricted opportunities for 
substantive improvements in decision making and understanding. Adopting what 
might be interpreted here as a roughly „behaviourally realistic‟ view of public health 
and safety authorities, it seems that for whatever reason, be it available time, 
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resources, knowledge or motivation, organisational approaches to risk communication 
rarely seem to meet the prescriptive ideals suggested by the mental models approach.  
 
Organisational risk communication is instead more commonly found to be formulated 
based on the intuitions of executive committees whose judgements are framed by 
personal experiences and sometimes supplemented by opinions, observations and 
findings derived from social scientific research published in academic journals or 
research reviews and technical appraisals such as the one presented here. This strong 
reliance on intuition to guide risk communication rather than a more formal 
assessment of public, expert and organisational knowledge and perceptions creates 
somewhat of a dilemma in formulating appropriate appraisal criteria for this review. 
On the one hand the protocols set out by the mental models approach are highly 
regarded in the academic community where it has been seen as setting the necessary 
pre-requisites for helping organisations to bridge critical knowledge between 
stakeholders and for developing and targeting health risk messages in a wide variety 
of settings. On the other hand, however, though it has been favoured by risk 
academics, the utilisation of the mental models approach is unfortunately seemingly 
not very widespread in government and business settings and as such does not yet 
constitute the „industry standard‟ for organisational risk communication protocols. 
There is a concern in this review therefore that incorporating the prescriptive ideals of 
the mental models approach as appraisal criteria might constitute a behaviourally 
unrealistic benchmark against which to evaluate EFSA‟s risk communication 
activities. Furthermore, it might likely also constitute an unfair measure of the 
standard of practice adopted by EFSA when it is not one that is widely recognised or 
so commonly practised elsewhere by many other institutions or organisations 
fulfilling a similar role. 
 
Therefore, whilst as reviewers we would strongly advocate adopting formal empirical 
protocols to help inform and guide risk communications such as those outlined by the 
mental models approach where resources are available, the limitations of setting this 
as a formal assessment criterion for this review are also recognised. Instead, a more 
moderate „middle ground‟ approach has been adopted which tries to focus on the 
basic lessons that risk communication practitioners might find useful in their day-to-
day work in the absence of mental models research, as indicated by previous work in 
this area. This is so as to maximise the utility of any insights that can be generated by 
the review by directing attention to where prescriptive advice would be most 
pertinent, applicable and practicable to ensure the conditions for substantively robust 
communications are met.  
 
The remainder of this section therefore concentrates on outlining the kind of basic 
information and advice that previous research has indicated people might require of 
public health authorities when appropriately communicated to help make informed 
judgements and choices about food-related health risks. This information is 
considered here with the caveat that the risk communication field is an evolving area 
and so this is not meant to provide a definitive guide to practitioners. We also agree 
with Fischhoff (1990) that organisations need to be especially cautious about 
replacing empirical information that might be elicited through formal inquiry with 
analytical representations of people derived from academic fields such as psychology. 
The focus on providing information to potential recipients should also not distract 
from the role of risk communication as a mechanism for institutional learning in the 
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face of uncertainty, as emphasised in the section on opening up appropriate 
communication channels above. 
 
Whilst basing risk communication decisions on understandings achieved through 
rigorous and objective social scientific research might be more preferable than say the 
more subjective bias of relying on anecdotal observations alone, academic research 
findings still need to be interpreted and contextualised with care. In fact there are 
many potential pitfalls awaiting those who draw prescriptive lessons directly from 
descriptive research findings, particularly when it comes to accounting for public 
perceptions of risk (MacDaniels 1998). To illustrate the case in point, there is some 
debate at present over the significance of recent research findings on judgement and 
decision making that has demonstrated that „affect‟ and „emotion‟ play a significant 
role in shaping the way that people perceive and respond to risk information (see 
Wardman 2006 for a recent discussion). The concern is that investigations into the 
emotional basis of how people may perceive risk may actually be taken to imply that 
people are „irrational‟ or „prone to panic‟ in response to risk information in any given 
situation. This belief could in turn then be used as justification for policy positions 
which lead to restrictions in the public provision of health risk information. This is a 
particular concern in light of claims made by some researchers that the issuing of risk 
communication by „risk entrepreneurs‟ and government agencies alike can be blamed 
for eliciting undue fears and cohering public anxieties regardless of scientific 
perspectives on the actual basis for harm (see Burgess 2003 for example).  
 
The grounds for these types of inferences need to be interpreted with care however. 
That is to say, general observations that people draw on emotion - or indeed 
deliberative analytical reasoning - to make risk judgements actually say little about 
what circumstances foster such responses and to what effect. In fact, the notion that 
risk information may induce irrationality or panic in individuals disproportionate to 
the actual context of risk exposure is contentious. Such assumptions appear to be 
rarely validated by descriptive research except in narrowly prescribed contexts even in 
extreme circumstances (see Sheppard et al 2006). Yet assuming otherwise without 
verifying the context in which such concerns are most applicable can and has in 
certain circumstances led public health officials to withhold vital information about 
risks deemed to be „too sensitive‟ to potential recipients for fear of eliciting mass 
panic or public hysteria. In fact, purposely restricting the flow of information may by 
definition help to perpetuate risk communication vacuums. Such actions are actually 
in many circumstances more likely to promote anxiety, rumours and hearsay, whereas 
providing timely and accurate information can improve knowledge which in turn is 
more likely to help to promote coping and self-efficacy (Wessely 2005). Moreover, 
withholding information can be seen as adopting a paternalistic position which can 
ignore the wishes of those citizens concerned and therefore goes against the 
democratic normative imperatives for informed choice and discussion in risk debates 
highlighted above. Recent research conducted by Lerner et al. (2003) and Fischhoff et 
al. (2003) has illustrated strong public support for providing honest, accurate 
information even if that information was deemed likely to worry people. 
Communication vacuums are therefore best avoided wherever possible with the 
provision of reliable messages that can help people to make informed decisions about 
a particular risk.  
 
In order for public health authorities to help people to make informed decisions, one 
task for risk communication is to foster individual understanding of the probability 
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and severity of the outcomes which might result from person‟s choosing or rejecting 
one option from a course of possible actions (Fischhoff 1998). Following Fischhoff 
(1999) „understanding‟ here implies to have a certain level of cognitive control over 
the issues of importance which means for individuals not only to have access to 
relevant facts as presented to them, but also to be able to integrate these facts into 
what is already known about the topic. In the psychological risk literature this is 
referred to as integrating new information into existing „mental models‟ or „schemas‟ 
(see Morgan et al. 2000). Where people have well formulated beliefs about the 
expected outcomes of various actions in familiar decision contexts health and safety 
authorities may aid this process by communications that emphasize particular 
information or merely add single missing facts which once received are easily 
understood and translated into individual choices. On the other hand, in unfamiliar 
decision contexts people‟s stock beliefs may be poorly formulated in which case 
communications may need to provide more substantive information. For example, 
information may be needed to help broaden people‟s knowledge about what is 
happening, how and why something may be dangerous and under what conditions, 
whether there is a need to do something and if so what the options are (Fischhoff 
1998). In some situations an organisation‟s stock knowledge may similarly benefit 
from communication exchanges with different stakeholders to elicit such information. 
Public health authorities are therefore well advised to determine the context for which 
each particular style of communication is needed.  
  
Following Fischhoff (1998), helping people to understand the probability and severity 
of the risk in question may therefore require to show how different (risk) effects are 
interconnected. Health and safety authorities may also need to demonstrate the 
scientific basis for understanding how risk exposure may be harmful and to what 
extent by contextualising this information in both quantitative and qualitative terms. 
In the first instance this may mean highlighting the consequences of particular actions 
and explaining the mechanisms which underpin how they are related. In the second 
instance demonstrating the scientific basis for concern means that wherever possible 
numbers should be provided and explained. As Fischhoff (1998) observes, 
possibilities are not probabilities and if experts fail to report risk in quantitative terms 
then they leave people to guess what they might possibly mean by statements such as 
„there is a small risk‟. This is because what might be described verbally as a „small‟ or 
„large‟ risk by one person using one set of values or normative assumptions may not 
correspond very well to how another person understands or uses those terms for 
example. The utility of providing numbers is a point of contention in the risk field. In 
the past, simply providing or trying to explain risk with numbers has been dismissed 
as an ineffective form of communication. In fact, officials brandishing raw numerical 
data from the latest risk assessment have sometimes been criticised for presenting 
risks in obscure terms (see Fischhoff 1995). One reason for this criticism is that 
assuming that „the numbers speak for themselves‟ can be taken as deliberate 
obfuscation of the facts rather than as being helpful which can serve to distance 
analysts from the public (Fischhoff 1995).  
 
Another argument against the use of numbers has focused on the popular conception 
that people generally do not have an intuitively good basic grasp of numbers in any 
form at all. For example, Crouch and Wilson (1982) have admonished that no one is 
born with an intuitive understanding of „one in a million‟ and that people only acquire 
such understanding through the use of comparisons. In an attempt to tell people what 
they mean by the numbers risk communication officials have thus been known to try 
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to make use of risk comparisons and analogies, but the use of such comparisons has in 
many instances been known to badly backfire (Bostrom 2006; Johnson 2003; Roth et 
al. 1990). Surprisingly relatively little research has been undertaken to try to 
understand how risk comparisons might be best used appropriately to aid successful 
risk communication, and to date the findings are decidedly mixed (see Bostrom 2008 
for a recent review). One conclusion of such work is that the use of good risk 
comparisons and analogies can help to simplify communication and improve learning 
and experience, but that they need to be adopted with caution. Konheim (1988) 
amongst others has forewarned that comparing the calculated risks of one activity 
with another runs the risk of being perceived to trivialise people‟s concerns. A 
common example given in this instance would be to compare the risks of cancer from 
one activity with the risks of consuming “30 diet sodas” or “40 table spoons of peanut 
butter over a lifetime”. Even if risk comparisons are utilised carefully so as not to 
oversimplify or trivialise the risk of concern, the potential success brought about by 
structurally aligning unfamiliar risks with more familiar risks can it seems still be 
undone because comparisons may also make salient the differences between risks as 
well as their similarities (Bostrom 2008).    
 
The fact that current risk communication research indicates the „jury is out‟ over the 
use of risk comparisons reiterates a concern for the need to make quantitative 
information available where it is practicable. People may not have a precise feeling 
for exact numbers however large or small, but many may still have a grasp of what 
basic numerical values might mean. For instance, whilst some may not, many people 
may have generally learned over time some intuition about what a certain probability 
or percentage chance of an occurrence might mean to them for example (Fischhoff 
1998). For many people this can arise through their time in formative and secondary 
education and in the workplace and even in their day-to-day activities from viewing 
weather forecasts to playing games of chance for example. These forms of numeracy 
may not be directly applicable to understanding risk estimates, but quantitative 
information (e.g. how probable the likelihood of exposure and the degree of harm 
within a population resulting from exposure a particular risk presents numerically 
speaking) can be helpful because it offers one of very few means by which to give 
people a common denominator for judging risks. This is not to say that verbal 
qualifiers are not generally seen to be helpful, but they also have their own limits. 
Qualitative terms used to describe risks and actions taken to mitigate against potential 
hazards such as „tolerable‟ and „precaution‟ are especially value laden and hence open to 
(mis)interpretation because normative assumptions underpin their usage and 
understanding. In other words, as with „small‟ and „large‟ what might constitute a 
„tolerable‟ risk or a „precautionary‟ risk response to one person utilising one set of 
normative values may not apply or correspond very well to how risks and actions taken 
to mitigate them might be interpreted or valued by another person utilising a different set 
of normative criteria. The use of these terms therefore also needs to be elaborated upon 
in risk communications so that people may understand how or why they have been used 
and what they mean to the person using them in a particular context.  
 
Information about how to control risk can also make information seem more salient 
and relevant by giving people a motive or incentive to entertain communications 
(Bostrom 2003). Effective decision making about risk involves not only a basic 
understanding of exposure and effects, it all requires concepts of how personal actions 
may help to increase or mitigate risk so as to be able to assess the threat of a potential 
hazard as well as possible responses and implications for self-efficacy (see Bostrom 
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2003). Fischhoff (2006) has forewarned, however, that providing confident guidance 
without strong evidence so that people have a sense of control can in some cases be 
misleading and damaging. In providing responsible communications authorities 
therefore ought to be candid about what is known, the quality of information being 
provided and significant uncertainties should be fully acknowledged. If there is 
conflict or ambiguity among stakeholders then information concerning the social 
context of communications may also need to be acknowledged along with how 
communications are attempting to meet expressed concerns so as not to give the 
impression that legitimate questions are being purposefully ignored. One final piece 
of practical advice that has been found to be useful is that central messages and key 
advice should be given at the beginning of communications and summarised at the 
end so as to help „signpost‟ whether they are relevant to individuals concerned and to 
make salient the information deemed to be most important to making decisions (see 
OECD 2002). It is also helpful to provide directions to where concerned or interested 
parties can find supplementary materials and advice if required.    
 
Summary Box 3. Delivering decision relevant information concisely and 
comprehensively 
- determine the communication context 
- Engaged in practices which help determine and foster understanding of the 
facts that stakeholders, citizens and the organisation itself most need to know 
- when designing communications: 
 give the central message at the beginning 
 include both quantitative and qualitative information where possible 
 provide supplementary information including about significant risk-risk tradeoffs 
and substitutions as well as risk-benefit tradeoffs 
 issue behavioural advice and guidance about what might be done to enhance self-
efficacy 
 highlight the risk management actions undertaken by the relevant actors to 
mitigate the risk 
 acknowledge the quality of information behind advice including any important 
uncertainties and the organisation‟s policy position in that regard for example 
 be cautious of inappropriate use of risk comparisons 
 contextualise the use of qualitative risk management terms such as 
„precautionary‟ and „tolerable‟ and other technical jargon 
 explain the social context for providing advice especially where there may be 
ambiguity in social risk discourses (e.g. are communications wishing to raise new 
concerns or to address concerns that have been raised elsewhere)  
 summarise key messages and advice given 
 provide directions to where supplementary information can be found 
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4. EFSA’s approach to food risk communication 
 
In its role as an objective advisory on food safety issues EFSA is mandated to act on 
its own initiative, whilst working in close collaboration with the European 
Commission and EU Member States, to ensure that the public and interested parties 
receive coherent, rapid, reliable, objective and comprehensible information. EFSA is 
ultimately responsible to the EU risk managers (European Commission, Member 
States and the European Parliament) but the Authority‟s communications on food and 
feed safety issues are aimed towards all interested parties and stakeholders and the 
general public at large. It is hoped that by providing risk managers with independent 
scientific risk assessments of the highest quality and disseminating such advice 
through effective risk communications that this will help to build public confidence in 
the risk assessment process and food safety in the EU. More specifically, EFSA‟s 
objectives in the area of risk communication are to establish trust in the Authority as a 
reputable organisation dedicated to the core values of independence, openness, 
transparency and scientific excellence, to ensure that messages are relevant, 
understandable and address food safety concerns, and to enhance the coherence of 
information on food safety matters across the European Community. Within this remit 
EFSA has the following overall strategy (EFSA 2006): 
 
- to understand consumer and public perception of food risk and risks associated 
with the food chain 
- bridge the gap between science and the consumer for example by translating 
science and explaining and contextualising risk  
- harness the support of key actors, such as national safety authorities, consumer 
associations and other NGOs as well as industry, in order to reach consumers 
with pertinent and effective messages 
- promote coherent and consistent risk communications across the Risk 
Assessment/Risk Management interface through close co-ordination with the 
European Commission and national actors for example  
 
Whilst striving to meet these objectives EFSA recognises that it is neither possible nor 
necessarily desirable to seek to address the diverse and multiple information needs of 
consumers in Member States through a single and unique message disseminated 
across Europe. EFSA has as such prioritised “influencing the influencers”, that is 
actors who regularly engage in consumer communications, with the information they 
require and with messages which can be further tailored and adapted to meet specific 
audience needs. So for example this would include national food safety authorities in 
Member States as a key target along with other stakeholder groups. EFSA also 
recognises the media as an important conduit for reaching these groups as well as a 
broader audience with more targeted messages. Although the scientific advice 
provided by EFSA is mainly of a technical nature all of EFSA‟s Scientific Committee 
and Panel opinions and other communications are available to the public at large, 
notably through EFSA website. As such EFSA has also made it a priority, whilst not 
being able to cater to all information needs, to make communications understandable 
and meaningful to non-scientists within a broader public audience and relevant to 
those with an interest in EFSA‟s work and the informed lay person.  
 
EFSA‟s mandate limits the Authority‟s role to risk assessment with no responsibility 
for the actual risk management practices implemented at the EU and National 
Member State level. EFSA may however, in addition also communicate scientific 
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appraisals of possible risk management options under its own initiative and if 
requested, which may be taken into consideration by the competent authorities 
responsible for making a risk management decision. EFSA also makes use of formal 
Advisory and Stakeholder forums, which allow the Authority to consult stakeholders 
such as non-institutional bodies, industry, NGOs and consumer groups, but without 
providing an opportunity for undue leverage of the Authority. The Authority also 
circulates press releases and official Scientific Committee and Expert Panel Opinions 
under embargo to stakeholders who might be concerned directly by a public 
announcement prior to their official publication date to help in outreach to their 
members thus allowing these stakeholders to be informed before the Authority goes to 
press with its scientific findings or opinions. 
 
Having briefly outlined EFSA‟s general approach to organisational risk 
communication this review now turns specifically to the risk communication activities 
undertaken by EFSA in relation to the four case studies selected. An outline of the 
particulars of each case is provided along with a summary of EFSA‟s respective risk 
communication activities and subsequent media coverage. These accounts draw 
largely on primary and secondary source materials provided by EFSA concerning 
their communication activities such as press releases, expert Panel Opinions, external 
presentations and internal media reviews, as well as supplementary information 
publicly available from EFSA‟s website and accounts of these issues provided in the 
news media and in stakeholder communications.   
 
4.1. The discovery of BSE in goats 
 
In late October 2004, French authorities and the European Commission informed the 
European public of a suspected case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 
identified in a goat in France. The European Commission immediately forwarded the 
data received from French authorities to the Community Reference Laboratory (CRL) 
so that experts could evaluate whether these new findings indicated the presence of 
BSE in a goat. The European Commission also requested that in the light of these new 
events EFSA provide advice on the safety of milk and meat in relation to TSE 
(Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy) in goats. Recognising the need to give 
immediate advice to consumers in light of this suspected case of BSE in a goat, EFSA 
issued preliminary advice on the health risks of goat milk and derived products on the 
basis of existing information. In a press release regarding a statement of the BSE/TSE 
Working Group of EFSA‟s Biological Hazards Panel (BIOHAZ), EFSA stated that 
“goat milk and goat milk products sourced from healthy animals, and irrespective of 
their geographical origin, are unlikely to present any risk of TSE contamination”. At 
the same time, EFSA made clear that more data were required to assess possible risks 
associated with goat meat and to undertake a comprehensive quantitative risk 
assessment of possible risks associated with the consumption of goat meat and milk.  
 
Later in January 2005 a case of BSE found in a goat was confirmed by the 
Community Reference Laboratory. In an announcement on the 28
th
 January 2005, 
Markos Kypriano, the EU Commissioner responsible for Health and Consumer 
Protection at that time said:  
 
“I want to reassure consumers that existing safety measures in the EU offer a very 
high level of protection. This case was discovered thanks to the EU testing system in 
place in France. The testing programme has shown us that there is a very low 
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incidence rate of TSEs in goats and allowed us to detect suspect animals so that they 
can be taken out of the food chain, as was done with this goat and its entire herd. I am 
proposing to extend testing further to determine whether this is an isolated incident.” 
 
The Commission extended surveillance of the goat population in the EU with respect 
to TSEs including discriminatory testing to differentiate between BSE and other TSEs 
in sheep and goats. EFSA provided an update on its plans to assess the safety of goat 
meat and goat meat products with respect to BSE/TSE. In a press release on 27
th
 
January 2005 EFSA announced that in line with previous advice milk sourced from 
clinically healthy animals was unlikely to present any risk of TSE contamination, but 
recognised that important information gaps remained to be filled in order to be able to 
deliver a quantitative risk assessment with regards to consumption of goat meat and 
goat meat products, which was expected to be completed by July 2005.  
 
When the case of BSE was confirmed in January 2005 it received significant media 
coverage in Europe and worldwide totalling 42 articles recorded by EFSA from all 
accessed sources. National media coverage in Europe was highest in France (12 
articles), followed by Italy (5 articles), the UK (3 articles), Germany (2 articles), and 
Spain (1 article) respectively. The majority of these articles based their information on 
the details distributed from DG Sanco of the European Commission whilst 40% of the 
articles collected referred to EFSA and clarified the position that further scientific 
research was necessary. At the time EFSA also received a small number of phone and 
email enquiries concerning what was perceived by a few journalists to be a 
discrepancy between the statements issued by the Commission and EFSA. It seems 
that in this correspondence some felt that the reassurances given by the Commission 
that consumers should carry on eating goat meat were perhaps too reassuring based on 
a perception that EFSA was saying there was not enough information to draw such a 
conclusion and more data and further testing was required. This apparent confusion 
needed clarification that the Commission was not in fact suggesting that there was no 
risk as there is no „zero risk‟ as such, and that the Commission was upholding its 
position to act as a responsible risk manager on this issue. 
 
On 28 June 2005 EFSA published a press release and organized a press briefing to 
provide an update on the risk assessment by the BOHAZ Panel of the safety of goat 
meat and goat meat products with regard to BSE. Whilst highlighting that important 
information gaps remained, EFSA stated that “the likely prevalence of BSE in the 
wider EU goat population is very low” and that “the current risk in terms of BSE, 
related to the consumption of goat meat and their products is considered at this time to 
be small”. The amount of media coverage this time was lower, EFSA recorded 31 
published articles in total following the June press release with all but two articles 
quoting the EFSA press release or comments made by EFSA members at the press 
briefing. The majority of articles reporting on the EFSA opinion reiterated EFSA‟s 
position that the prevalence of BSE in the EU goat population was “very low” and 
that risk to human health related to the consumption of goat meat was considered to 
be “small” at that time, but that further scientific research would be undertaken as 
necessary. 
 
In their communications EFSA had hoped to convey a balanced message that the risk 
was perceived by experts as being low and that appropriate measures were in place to 
manage the risk (e.g. increased surveillance), but that this included a need to continue 
to monitor and research the issue. EFSA aimed to be transparent and proactive in their 
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communications approach which involved keeping the public informed at each stage 
and to outline areas of uncertainty and knowledge gaps so that stakeholders, the media 
and the public could understand the scale of the risk and what public authorities were 
doing about it. EFSA felt that this was aided by adopting consistent and co-ordinated 
communications with the key actors involved – EFSA, the European Commission, the 
Community Reference Laboratory (responsible for verifying the case of suspected 
BSE) and the French authorities. The challenge was seen as being able to 
communicate to the media on EFSA‟s findings regarding the results of the Authority‟s 
risk assessment in a balanced and measured way proportionate to the actual risk so as 
to inform the public sufficiently and transparently without causing undue concern or 
over reaction. Following the absence of negative news stories and messages of alarm 
it was felt that EFSA was seen as reassuring and as such that the key messages 
contained in the announcement helped to ensure that communications did not trigger 
an alarm. Taken all together EFSA believed that their efforts and co-ordination with 
other public authorities constituted a communications strategy that helped to reassure 
the public that the situation was under control and managed in the public interest and 
thus averted what they believed might otherwise have turned out to be an unnecessary 
or disproportionate alarm or public panic. 
 
4.2. The safety of wild and farmed fish 
 
In January 2004 the journal Science published a research article by Hites et al. which 
asserted that farmed salmon was more hazardous than wild salmon and that European 
salmon was significantly more hazardous than North and South American salmon. 
Moreover, the authors also claimed that the results of the study (which was thought by 
the authors to be the only rigorous risk assessment of the potential human health risks 
of farmed salmon consumption) confirmed that consumption of farmed Atlantic 
salmon may pose health risks that detract from the beneficial effects of fish 
consumption (Hites et al. 2004). Although there had previously been some concerns 
in Europe with regards to the safety of fish from the Baltic sea for example, and for 
which previous dietary advice to consumers had been issued by national health 
authorities, this new research triggered heightened concerns in the popular media and 
in a small number of scientific publications that levels of compounds such as dioxins 
and heavy metals such as mercury in fish represented a human health hazard even at 
existing levels of consumption. Following these concerns the European Parliament 
requested EFSA to conduct a scientific assessment of the health risks related to human 
consumption of wild and farmed fish marketed in the European Union focussing on 
the presence and adverse effects of persistent organochlorine pollutants (POPs) and 
other contaminants for which analytical data existed and on the methodologies for 
setting safety limits.  
 
On 18
th
 March 2004 EFSA published an opinion regarding the possible risks to 
human health associated with the consumption of mercury, notably in fish principally 
in the form of methylmercury, along with a press release in which „precautionary 
advice‟ was given to „vulnerable groups‟ namely children and women of child bearing 
age. EFSA‟s Scientific Panel on Contaminants in the Food Chain (CONTAM) also 
advised further dietary studies to be undertaken in vulnerable groups where specific 
intake data was lacking but it was thought that provisional tolerable weekly intake 
levels by European consumers may at times be close to limits set by the US NRC and 
those established by the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives. 
EFSA endorsed precautionary advice by national food safety authorities and 
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recommended that those vulnerable groups identified in particular select fish from a 
wide range of species without giving undue preference to large predatory fish such as 
swordfish and tuna likely to contain higher levels of methylmercury. EFSA also 
advised that additional dietary advice to consumers could also be sought from national 
food authorities in EU Member States.  
 
After further research, on 5
th
 July 2005 EFSA published another opinion on the health 
risks related to the consumption of wild and farmed fish, this time asserting that there 
were no differences between the two in terms of safety and nutritional value. EFSA at 
this time also iterated the nutritional value of consuming fish rich in long chain n-3 
polyunsaturated fatty acids as beneficial to cardiovascular health and to foetal 
development which should therefore be weighted against potential risks. Nutritional 
dietary guidelines were issued suggesting weekly fish consumption of one to two 
portions per week would not lead to intakes of dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs which 
cause safety concerns except for fatty fish caught in the Baltic whilst taking intakes 
from other sources into account. EFSA recommended in accordance with previous 
advice in March 2004 with respect to methylmercury that women eating up to two 
portions of fish per week were unlikely to exceed tolerable intake levels provided 
certain types of predatory fish were avoided. Supplementary guidance on appropriate 
dietary consumption of fish was also provided by national food safety authorities in 
EU Member States.  
 
Furthermore, EFSA stated that evidence showed there were no consistent differences 
in the nutrient and contamination levels of wild and farmed fish contrary to previous 
research (e.g. Hites et al. 2004) which had not taken into account the broad variability 
of factors that affect levels of contaminants in fish. As such EFSA advised that fish, 
whether farmed or wild in Europe had a place in a well balanced diet with respect to 
their safety for the consumer notwithstanding the exception of consuming fish from 
the Baltic Sea. In addition to the press releases and published opinions, EFSA also 
made available extended background and supplementary information to support their 
communications on this issue including a „frequently asked questions‟ document. 
Press coverage recorded by EFSA following this press release was relatively much 
lower than for the other case studies with only 10 articles, the highest number was in 
Spain (5 articles), followed by France (2 articles) the UK (1 article), Germany (1 
article) and Italy (1 article). These articles were generally factual and proportionate 
and based primarily upon the EFSA press release.  
 
 
4.3. The discovery of semicarbazide in baby food 
 
In July 2003, EFSA was informed by the food industry about the possible presence of 
the chemical substance semicarbazide (SEM) in certain foodstuffs packed in glass jars 
with metal lids sealed with plastic (PVC) gaskets. The discovery was made during 
routine analytical monitoring carried out by food manufacturers. Semicarbazide was 
not intentionally added during food production, rather it was a breakdown product of 
azodicarbonamide that had migrated from sealing gaskets used in the metal lids of 
glass jars and so its formation could not have been reasonably anticipated. The 
presence of semicarbazide was therefore not linked to a particular foodstuff, but more 
specifically to the type of packaging utilised for a range of products. These products 
included fruit juices, jams and conserves, honey, ketchup, pickles and sterilized 
vegetables, mayonnaise, mustard and sauces, and most notably baby food fed to 
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millions of children by their parents or other guardians daily. Upon receiving this 
information, EFSA convened an ad hoc expert group meeting of EFSA‟s Scientific 
Panel on Food Additives, Flavourings, Food Processing Aids and Materials in Contact 
with Food (AFC) on 24th July 2003 in order to review available data and scientific 
information. Semicarbazide was thought to be carcinogenic, possibly genotoxic (i.e. 
with the potential of damaging the genetic material of cells or DNA), and a significant 
level of scientific uncertainty remained regarding both levels of human exposure and 
the possible health implications. The group determined that it was not possible to 
provide a scientifically based risk assessment at the time, but drafted a report giving 
preliminary advice on the occurrence of semicarbazide in foods which was made 
available to the public on 28th July 2003. In a press release issued on that day, EFSA 
announced the publication of the preliminary advice of the ad hoc expert group that 
the discovery of semicarbazide had been made but that the conclusion of the Expert 
Group was that in view of the uncertainties in both the analytical and toxicological 
aspects it would be premature to give risk assessment advice given that further 
research was planned and underway. EFSA made clear that it was the Authority‟s 
intent to initiate its own short term genotoxicity studies in order to address gaps in 
data required to carry out a risk assessment. EFSA also advised that further 
information would be provided to the public following review of these future findings 
by scientific experts.  
 
Following the receipt of the new research findings, as well as further data provided by 
industry, a second meeting of the AFC Panel was convened over 30th September and 
1st October 2003 in order to review the new scientific evidence that had been made 
available. However, during that meeting EFSA determined that before issuing the risk 
assessment on semicarbazide in foods, further issues might also need to be considered 
particularly with regard to baby food (discussed below). Another meeting was held on 
9th October in order to bring together a broader range of scientific experts such as 
toxicologists, specialists in microbiology and paediatric nutrition along with experts 
from the AFC Panel as well as the Panels on Contaminants in the Food Chain 
(CONTAM) and the Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition and Allergies (NDA). In 
agreement with the European Commission, EFSA‟s scientific experts undertook to 
provide advice regarding various risk management options. The implications of 
semicarbazide in baby food were discussed taking into account nutritional and 
microbiological considerations. In evaluating the different options to manage this 
potential risk, other substitution dangers were also considered. For instance it was 
thought possible that there might be nutritional concerns should suitable alternatives 
not readily be found by mothers wishing to discontinue using these foods. Other 
methods of producing baby food including the making and storing of food at home 
under less hygienic conditions were also thought to pose a potential health threat for 
young babies. The hasty replacement by industry of sealing gaskets which might not 
confer the same microbiological protection was also considered as possibly exposing 
babies to a greater health risk than the potential risk associated with exposure to 
semicarbazide.  
 
Following this expert consultation, an update on semicarbazide in foods and its 
implications for human health was communicated by EFSA to the public on 15th 
October 2003. In the announcement the outcome of EFSA‟s risk assessment on 
semicarbazide in foods was made known, but EFSA also went beyond providing a 
scientific statement by including advice to consumers. As semicarbazide was in the 
food supply and could not be immediately removed EFSA perceived a need for their 
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risk communications to address the implications of the risk assessment for consumers 
as well as stakeholders and risk managers. In particular EFSA felt it was necessary to 
include both dietary advice for consumers and risk reduction advice to the 
Commission relative to manufacturing practices such that the levels of semicarbazide 
found in foods packed in glass jars be reduced as swiftly as technological progress 
would allow. The key message contained in the press release issued by EFSA on 15th 
October 2003 was: “No reason to change current dietary habits including for babies. 
Precautionary action by industry recommended for baby foods”. EFSA chose to hold 
a press briefing on this topic, with the participation of the Chair of the AFC Panel, Dr. 
Sue Barlow, in order to communicate the findings, answer questions from media and 
facilitate understanding of the outcome of the risk assessment and its implications.  
 
Regional coverage of EFSA‟s semicarbazide announcement was relatively 
widespread and generated 87 media articles worldwide recorded by EFSA in October 
2003. However, it is interesting to note that there were some large regional differences 
in the coverage of this issue. Media coverage was highest in the UK (33 articles), but 
considerably lower elsewhere in Europe with Spain (5 articles), followed by France (3 
articles), and Germany (2 articles). It has been noted elsewhere of the UK press 
coverage that although the content of articles was generally factual, balanced and 
reassuring that the headlines used to break the story were more alarming such as 
“Baby food jars in cancer toxin scare” (Motarjemi and Mortimore 2005).  
Furthermore, research conducted on behalf of the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) 
has suggested that the communications issued by the FSA were different in tone to 
those of EFSA (Bailey 2007). In particular, it was suggested that whilst 
communications by the FSA were not recommending that parents should be 
concerned this message was qualified with the view that it would be understandable if 
they were and may therefore have undermined the primary message. This approach 
was viewed particularly by the food industry as having led the consumer, rather than 
merely presenting the facts and letting them decide for themselves. Secondary 
communications messages by EFSA were by comparison seen to be more concerned 
with the relative risks of semicarbazide and the possible microbial contamination that 
might occur with other forms of food packaging. Whilst the communications by 
EFSA and the FSA were not significantly different in substantive content, it may be 
possible that the UK media picked up on the difference in tone which was perceived 
to have been implicit in the framing of FSA messages. However, it should also be 
acknowledged that the FSA was responding to what it perceived to be the 
communication requirements of the British public following some small empirical 
research and so communications were deemed to be focussed on meeting a demand 
for supplementary information and taking consumer concerns seriously.  
 
In conclusion EFSA felt that overall there had been a relatively small amount of 
media coverage across Europe for what might potentially have been a much more 
controversial risk issue. It was believed that although there were some notable 
exceptions, the content and tone of media coverage was relatively well measured and 
proportionate and that EFSA‟s communications strategy had been successful in 
raising awareness without generating undue panic or alarm.  
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4.4. The risk of genetically modified organisms in the food chain 
 
From the mid-1980s onwards, regulation of GM crops in Europe has been primarily 
associated with the invocation of the „precautionary principle‟ following early 
Directives from the European Commission which upheld that preventative action 
should be undertaken to control potential risks to public health and the environment 
by requiring risk assessments for regulatory approval prior to the release of GM crops 
and products (see Rogers 2004 for a review). At a very early stage regulators took the 
view that a precautionary strategy was needed in response to the perceived failures of 
a reactive regulatory system for controlling pesticides in agriculture, and that by 
adopting precaution-based regulation this would help to allay public fears about GM 
technology and smooth the path of new products to the market (Tait 2001). A concern 
for precaution by several EU Member States has also been cited as having led to a de 
facto moratorium on the authorisation for growing or commercial release of GM crops 
in Europe in 1999 (Rogers 2004). Yet, in spite of the relatively stringent approach to 
the introduction of GM crops and food products (when contrasted with the US and 
elsewhere for example), it is commonly regarded that European citizen‟s stance on 
GMOs has become increasingly negative. Indeed, the potential introduction of GM 
crops and food products in Europe has become generally less well received over the 
past two decades. Public opinion surveys have on various occasions shown that there 
is relatively little public faith in the virtues of GM food crops and products and 
significant doubt that any associated risks will be managed competently (Poortinga 
and Pidgeon 2003; Gaskell et al. 2003), although there is some variability in public 
perceptions within and between populations (Hohl and Gaskell 2008).  
 
Set against a highly politicised and value-laden backdrop EFSA has come to occupy a 
pivotal role in the approval of GM technology for commercial use in food and 
agriculture. Before GMOs can be legislated for import, cultivation and food or feed 
use in the European Union they have to pass a safety assessment requested by the 
European Commission and Member States. EFSA‟s role in these respects is to provide 
independent scientific advice to European Union Institutions and Member States on 
the risks for human and animal health and the environment. This advice is then taken 
into account by the requesting legislating body when giving or refusing approval for 
the use of GMO products. As of 12
th
 March 2008 EFSA had issued 42 opinions on the 
safety of GMOs, and out of the 166 total press releases made by EFSA on all issues 
by that time 27 were specifically GMO related. In conducting this review it was not 
feasible to present a detailed case analysis on the communications surrounding each 
of the individual GMO opinions. Instead the analysis provides an overview of EFSA‟s 
risk communication activities in relation to GMOs more generally.  
 
Communications by EFSA over this time related to a number of specific issues. These 
included: the publication of opinions by EFSA on the safety of GM crops and food 
products at the request of the Commission; the opening of public consultations on the 
risk assessment of GMOs; responses to external criticism by Friends of the Earth 
(FOE); GMO technology guidance documents; the re-appraisal and reassertion of 
Scientific Panel Opinions in light of Member State challenges and reports; and the 
strengthening of cooperation and dialogue between EFSA and EU Member States on 
the GMO issue. Additionally, included within EFSA‟s press releases the Authority 
made 5 „press statements‟ on GMO related issues. This number is comparatively high 
as by this point only 8 press statements had been made by EFSA in all other areas. 
Therefore, it is clear that of all the potential food risk related issues that occupy 
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EFSA‟s time and attention the proportion taken up by GMO concerns is notably 
significant. This relatively high level of activity for the most part reflects the volume 
of opinions requested by the European Commission on the safety of applications of 
GM technology, but it also evidently reflects a number of social and political concerns 
underpinning the social acceptance of GMOs in European Union Member States 
following intense stakeholder interest in this issue.  
 
During this time a number of challenges were made by NGOs and European Union 
Member States to the approval of GM food, feed and crops following risk assessments 
undertaken by EFSA which declared that they were in fact safe. For example, the 
safety of several GMO products was questioned by Member States such as Austria 
and Hungary following internal reviews which led to the imposition of restrictions on 
GMO import and use by those nations concerned. This was despite the fact that the 
safety of the GM products in question had undergone prior assessment by EFSA and 
found to be safe. EFSA was subsequently called upon by the Commission on several 
occasions to reassess the safety of the GMO products concerned in light of Member 
State appraisals and to determine if any further information had come to light to 
question the Scientific Panel Opinions previously issued. EFSA did not find sufficient 
cause to change its prior assessments in each case, but in the event EFSA was accused 
by NGOs of not having taken certain scientific issues into consideration and these 
instances of contestation were particularly newsworthy events and received much 
coverage in the media. The Commission also subsequently made several proposals to 
improve the scientific consistency and transparency for decisions on GMOs and 
develop consensus between all interested parties thereby requiring EFSA to more 
fully justify its scientific advice (EC 2006).  
 
In response to these concerns EFSA has since embarked upon a number of 
consultative programmes and initiatives, but at this time whether these efforts will in 
part help to ameliorate concerns remains to be seen. Certainly, NGOs such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have remained critical of EFSA‟s opinions on 
the safety of GMOs. Furthermore, the Authority has received criticism from 
academics such as Levidow and Carr (2007) and van Asselt and Vos (2008) for 
narrowing the scope of expertise and opinion in GMO risk assessment and its impact 
on subsequent risk management options up until 2006. What is clear is that for many 
early opinions and press releases in the early stages the rationales and understandings 
that informed EFSA‟s risk assessments and the Authority‟s subsequent 
communication on these issues were not fully explicated. EFSA‟s communications 
strategy also appears to have been reactive for the most part, with the Authority in 
several instances often having to respond to criticism rather than taking a proactive 
approach to addressing possible concerns. However, whereas earlier opportunities for 
consultation and comment had focussed on technical questions and issues such as risk 
assessment methodology and procedure, much more progress has since been made as 
later efforts have are characterised by a more active attempt by EFSA to better engage 
with NGOs, stakeholders and Member States and their concerns about these issues.
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 However, it should be noted that as of 2009 the GMO debate rumbles on. 
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5. Analysis 
 
5.1. EFSA’s creation of risk communication channels 
 
Adopting a policy of openness and transparency has been an appropriate strategy for 
EFSA. Being frank and upfront about the potential food risks and related uncertainties 
at each stage for example in the cases of BSE in goats and semicarbazide in foods has 
helped to keep stakeholders and consumers informed and up to date not only with 
regard to the status of the potential risks in each case, but also with what progress has 
been made by EFSA and any actions undertaken by the Authority along with other 
stakeholders to help mitigate against any potential harms to human health. These two 
food risk issues in particular were rightly considered to be potentially highly sensitive 
to consumers, especially given the recent history of the BSE scandal in Europe with 
regard to the goat case and the heightened sensitivity of potential cancer risks to 
children in relation to the semicarbazide case, which could make both cases especially 
newsworthy.  
 
If we employ a hypothetical counter factual analysis whereby EFSA had been 
perceived to have ignored or underplayed the importance of the discovery of BSE in 
goats or failed to report on the discovery of semicarbazide in baby food, then this 
would seem likely to have generated the impression that lessons had not been learned 
from the previous food scandals such as the BSE crisis. This might have then lead to 
media amplification of the risks irrespective of scientific findings and official 
guidance and advice by EFSA. Such an eventuality would likely have been an early 
major setback to EFSA in its ambition to become seen as a reliable and trusted source 
of information about food risks. Instead, following EFSA‟s proactive approach a well 
tempered response was observed for the most part in both cases in that initial media 
coverage was reasonably high and widespread, but content was relatively measured in 
tone and coverage subsided reasonably quickly afterwards in each case. In the event, 
this was likely helped by the openness and responsiveness displayed by EFSA‟s 
communication activities at the time. EFSA provided a platform for the press to 
ascertain the status of these risks and ask questions to clarify any further uncertainties. 
A similar approach was adopted with regards to the safety of wild and farmed fish and 
the collaboration between all the stakeholders including EFSA, the European 
Commission, national health authorities and various others is commendable in these 
three cases and attempting to promote an informed social discourse about these risk 
issues. For example, it is also noted that EFSA recognised and acknowledged the 
potential for „risk substitutes‟ (or „risk-risk‟ tradeoffs) possibly arising from adopting 
precautionary measures in their communications and this concern was taken up by 
national food agencies. 
 
However, the concern for opening appropriate risk communication channels does to 
some extent raise the question as to what point EFSA‟s responsibility for the 
communications produced by the Authority begin and end in relation to consumers. 
Whilst EFSA has worked to provide stakeholders such as national food safety 
authorities with the information they might need allowing them to address the cultural 
and national specific requirements of communications, there may well also be a need 
to further examine and clarify EFSA‟s role in targeting specific groups and the 
Authority‟s success in doing so. EFSA‟s present risk communication strategy in many 
instances adopts carefully prepared communications focussing on „influencing the 
influencers‟ (e.g. consumer groups and the press) along with providing supplementary 
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information either through press conference question and answer sessions or further 
written materials on EFSA‟s website. This is sometimes an efficient way of raising 
awareness amongst many of the general public if well managed, but to get messages 
across to specific groups risk communications may need to be repeated on a number 
of occasions and on a number of different platforms to ensure that information is 
effectively disseminated and people are adequately informed. As iterated in the recent 
Special Eurobarometer report on “Risk Issues” (2006), risk communication often 
needs to be specifically targeted to be most effective. To this end EFSA‟s strategic 
approach currently places a primary responsibility on national health authorities and 
the news media to communicate possible risks across the EU. However, the 
communication requirements identified by national food health and safety authorities 
and the new media may diverge from those of EFSA as well as from one another. Any 
such divergences may therefore lead to different framings of risk issues and varying 
types of national response including the absence of national level communications. 
Message inconsistency may therefore not necessarily reflect a failure in the 
communications of EFSA as such, but rather that there are necessarily nuances in the 
ways different national authorities identify particular risk communication needs 
within their populaces as seen in the semicarbazide case for example. EFSA cannot 
take full responsibility either for national authority communications based on EFSA‟s 
opinions and press releases or indeed the uptake of risk communications by 
consumers across the EU, but it should make available information to consumers as 
and when required. To this end EFSA‟s website plays a vital role in allowing the 
public to be informed where and whenever necessary and it may be useful to conduct 
some survey work to examine whom uses the website, in what circumstances and how 
they appraise website information.  
 
The issue of GMOs is noted for presenting a rather different series of communication 
challenges for EFSA. The development and use of GMOs in food and food production 
has notably been the subject of a long running controversy between a host of different 
stakeholders holding diverging scientific, cultural and political beliefs, opinions and 
concerns about their acceptability for commercial environmental use and public 
consumption (see for example Tait 2003). Attempts by EFSA to communicate 
scientific opinion on the safety of GMOs have therefore subsequently been made 
against this highly politicised backdrop of social discourse, debate and socio-political 
ambiguity and have as such been the subject of some public criticism by certain 
stakeholders (see below). Part of the challenge for EFSA in these regards has been to 
determine how to engage with these different stakeholders given the political aspects 
of those social tensions over GMOs. The Authority has within its remit operated on 
the basis of independence and transparency, but initially EFSA engaged only in 
informal interactions and exchanges with many stakeholders though this was not 
publicly documented in any great detail. Although EFSA has always been open to 
feedback, particularly through the public consultations, the avenues for input have 
tended to be restricted primarily to scientific matters.  Only relatively recently in 
2006, following a raft of public criticism from NGOs, notably Friends of the Earth 
(FOE) and Greenpeace, as well as concern in the Commission EFSA embarked on a 
well publicised formal consultation process instigating a broad social dialogue on 
GMOs, not only with NGOs, but also the European Commission and EU Member 
States. In retrospect, EFSA might have advisably instigated a formal public dialogue 
with some of these other stakeholders much earlier. Instead, in this case a reactive 
communication strategy seems to have been employed which may have created the 
impression that EFSA was in effect backed into a corner to meet with NGOs 
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following vociferous criticism rather than being a willing partner from start. The 
initial opportunities for feedback and input may not have therefore provided adequate 
scope to elicit and address some of the issues that culminated in such strong 
complaints later on in the process. Whatever truth there may be to that perception, as 
EFSA is now engaging more proactively with stakeholders this is to be acknowledged 
and commended as a positive activity for the Authority. Given the political constraints 
EFSA‟s present course of action with regard to formally meeting with NGOs is an 
appropriate response, but EFSA should recognise that this action is unlikely to address 
all stakeholders‟ concerns about the risk management or approval for use of GMOs in 
Europe more generally.  
 
5.2. Stakeholder representations of EFSA’s credibility  
 
In general, the findings derived from this study suggest that the competence and 
proficiency of EFSA have not been brought specifically into question for any of the 
cases studied except with regard to GMOs. This also seems to be reflected in the 
respective media coverage for each case, which generally remained factual and 
representative of EFSA‟s advice when reporting on the risks of BSE in goats, 
semicarbazide and SWAFF. The safety of GMOs however, is an issue that has been 
singled out by NGO‟s for greater treatment as part of a vigorous anti-GMO campaign 
throughout Europe. In this regard EFSA has been accused of failing to provide 
adequate risk assessments of GMOs and being unable to redress or sufficiently follow 
up scientific concerns and uncertainties that have been raised by different stakeholders 
in relation to several of EFSA‟s official opinions (see Box 4). The main protagonists 
of this criticism were Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace.  
 
Box 4. Example stakeholder quotes questioning the competence and proficiency of EFSA  
 
“…The EFSA failed to fully investigate unexpected sequences discovered in the genome after 
modification. Research shows that such sequences shut down neighbouring genes. The EFSA ignored 
guidance on allergy testing that EU scientists produced in 2003 which would lead to more thorough 
testing.” FOE February 17th 2004 
 
“EFSA: Failing Consumers and the Environment”  
“The creation of EFSA has not improved the regulation of GE crops. The criticisms made of old 
legislation, before the EFSA was set up, are still valid. The data is often of poor quality and where 
differences and irregularities have been found, these have not been followed up sufficiently. There is 
no consideration of high quality data where any departures from substantial equivalence are 
investigated thoroughly…For now the EFSA, has most certainly not contributed to a high level of 
consumer and environmental protection from GE crops and foodstuffs.”   
“…EFSA evaluations are unsatisfactory and open to the same criticisms as the old evaluation process. 
GMOs are being approved despite crucial data being missing, an awareness of technical failures 
concerning the transferred gene sequences and evidence of technical failures…The inadequacy of 
EFSA evaluation procedures is confirmed by revelations published in “LeMonde” today…it is of deep 
concern that EFSA does not seem to be contributing to a higher standard of GMO risk assessment” 
Greenpeace April 23
rd
 2004   
 
 
Where other stakeholders did question the credibility of EFSA this was with regard to 
issues of fairness, impartiality and efficiency more generally. For example, BEUC 
expressed notable concerns about the composition of EFSA‟s management board and 
the undue influence of EU Member States along with a petition for risk assessment to 
remain divorced from risk management. In conjunction to these concerns Greenpeace 
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and FOE have complained that the scientists working for EFSA have stakes at both 
the EU Member State level and in one case with regard to the German Biotech 
industry and that EFSA Opinions to date have consistently been supportive of the 
Biotech industry.  
 
Box 5. Example stakeholder quotes questioning EFSA’s fairness and impartiality 
 
“Friends of the Earth published a damning critique of EFSA… accusing it of bias and going beyond its 
remit to benefit the biotechnology industry. Since its conception EFSA has rejected virtually every 
concern raised by Member States about the safety of GM foods and crops.” FOE  5th October 2005 
 
“we are not at all confident that the Council decided for the best representation of the various interests 
in the EFSA Management Board. The Authority must now win our trust by the excellence and 
independence of its work.” BEUC 3rd February 2003 
 
“Candidates were appointed in the basis of nationality and not of competence… In appointing so many 
national officials to the Board, the Council did not fulfil the requirement of securing a broad range of 
relevant expertise…will make it difficult for the Authority to win the confidence of consumers and 
serve as a point of reference by virtue of its independence”. BEUC 7th November 2003 
 
 
In response to these allegations EFSA has seemingly only re-asserted that Panel 
Member views are independent rather than actively demonstrating that to be the case. 
This was not a particularly robust rejection of critics‟ claims and it is not clear at this 
stage whether EFSA‟s meetings with NGOs will ameliorate these types of concerns. 
BEUC was notable however for being appreciative of EFSA‟s efforts to provide 
guidance for the information needed for the risk assessment of GMOs (see Box 6).  
 
Box 6. Example stakeholder quotes in support of EFSA 
 
“If the EFSA is prepared to deal with issues that of most concern to customers, BEUC and its member 
organisations across Europe are ready to become involved and to help EFSA become a success.” 
BEUC 3
rd
 February 2003 
 
“BEUC appreciate the efforts of EFSA to provide guidance for the information needed for the risk 
assessment of genetically modified plants and derived food and feed” BEUC 12th May 2004 
 
In other respects the efficient and effective functioning of EFSA was brought into 
question by the Authority itself in two press release where significant concerns were 
expressed that funding restrictions and projected funding cuts would undermine the 
quality and quantity of risk assessments conducted by EFSA. These concerns could 
also damage the credibility of risk assessments conducted by EFSA if expected 
funding did not materialise by giving the impression that the Authority was under-
resourced for the successful fulfilment of its mission.     
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5.3. EFSA’s delivery of decision relevant information 
 
Risk communications by EFSA were for the most part seen to deliver a reasonable 
standard of decision relevant information. There are however some specific points to 
be made in respect to each of the cases studied which are discussed below. The main 
exception to this relatively positive appraisal was to be found with earlier 
communications on GMOs both by comparison to more recent communications on 
GMOs and to those of the other case studies investigated. These communications in 
particular rarely provided background documentation and failed to report risk 
assessments in any great detail or contextualise opinions in light of any social and 
political ambiguities and concerns expressed in wider social risk discourses. For 
example, on a number of occasions EFSA failed to acknowledge or elaborate upon 
criticisms and concerns raised by EU Member States and NGOs such as with regards 
to some remaining scientific uncertainties associated with the safety of GMOs. 
Another concern is that a communication vacuum on the role of EFSA appears to 
have temporarily emerged which seemingly allowed NGO communications to 
conflate EFSA‟s role in the assessment of GMOs with wider concerns about the risk 
management of GMOs within Europe. As such EFSA may have for a time been 
perceived as ignoring social concerns about GMOs in these instances. That said, 
EFSA has made progress in more recent communications relating to GMOs by 
providing more comprehensive documentation and supplementary materials and with 
regards to the aforementioned publicised efforts to engage with other stakeholders.   
 
In the other cases the provision of decision relevant information was generally much 
better following the normative concerns set out above (see Box 3). Concerning EFSA 
opinions about the discovery and public health risk of BSE in goat meat and milk 
press releases could have perhaps provided more quantitative information up front to 
help guide consumers; for example, relating to the possible prevalence of BSE in goat 
herds only one of the three press releases referenced how many goats had been tested 
in total. These press releases as well as official opinions could also have been more 
forthright in their advice to consumers as it was only generally inferred indirectly that 
goat meat within a certain age was thought not to be a risk and thus safe to consume. 
The earlier two press statements and opinions could have also summarised the key 
messages at the end.  
 
The provision of decision relevant information in press releases and EFSA opinions 
for the safety of wild and farmed fish was similarly observed to match most of the 
criteria adopted by this review being generally thorough with few points to criticise. 
The same was found for materials relating to the semicarbazide discovery. 
Communications in these cases were generally found to provide the relevant facts that 
citizens might need to know, included quantitative and qualitative information where 
possible and supplementary information about substitution dangers and advice to 
enhance self-efficacy as well as details about the risk management actions undertaken 
to mitigate the risks for example. EFSA can also be commended in the semicarbazide 
case for seeking further views on the countervailing risks of to improve the 
substantive basis for decisions concerning the information and advice provided to 
consumers. However, the advice issued was underpinned by concerns for uncertainty 
and the need for „precautionary‟ risk management. This could have been elaborated 
upon in EFSA communications to better inform recipients for example by clarifying 
what was meant by precaution and the rationale behind that advice. This could help to 
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avoid possible confusions in the media which might similarly have been repeated 
elsewhere by members of the public.       
 
In this instance post-communications follow-up to evaluate of the impact of messages 
beyond simply utilising media analysis would be beneficial to EFSA. In such cases 
EFSA could for example utilise other resources and develop further relationships with 
stakeholders to ascertain how advice issued by the Authority was received and 
whether it was followed. It may have been useful if feedback could have been 
gathered from national food safety authorities or food manufacturers and retailers on 
consumption patterns following EFSA communications on wild and farmed fish and 
semicarbazide in food as well as consumption of goat and goat products. EFSA‟s 
website is potentially a highly valuable and accessible resource for consumers and as 
such website monitoring and surveys may prove to be helpful to gage whether it is 
similarly regarded so by website users. It may be noted during this research that there 
were some broken links from some of the older archived press releases and opinions.  
 
One concern that arose while conducting this review was that in many instances the 
media‟s delivery of decision relevant information did not always match levels that 
would be required by consumers to make informed decisions following the kinds of 
decision relevant criteria set out by this review. It is suggested that as EFSA relies 
very much on intermediaries to disseminate its communications it could perhaps work 
with what are considered to be the „influencers‟ (i.e. members of the press and 
consumer groups and other interested stakeholders such as Member State food safety 
authorities) to develop guideline criteria for reporting food risk informed by social 
science. For instance the BBC has a set of example criteria for reporting risk (see Box 
8). Similar guideline criteria more specifically tailored to the requirements of 
reporting food risk could be similarly developed to be used by different stakeholders. 
To develop such criteria EFSA could arrange an open consultation or workshop on the 
science of risk communication with input from psychologists and behavioural 
scientists on the technicalities of risk communication message design for example.  
 
At this time EFSA cannot rely solely on the capacities of every news and media 
agency to follow criteria such as those employed by the BBC to ensure the quality and 
consistency of communications. EFSA may help foster good communications in 
others through continually improving the quality and consistency of its own 
communications, but could consider partnering with other stakeholders to develop risk 
reporting protocols that can be used by media reporters and consumer organisations to 
make sure that communications are underpinned by scientific principles to meet the 
needs of the general public. The intention here would not be to tell members of the 
media what to report, but rather that the Authority could begin a constructive dialogue 
between different stakeholders drawing on a variety of expertise about the kinds of 
information that would prove most useful to consumers and how it might be 
communicated. 
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Box 8. Example checklist criteria used within the BBC for reporting risk 
(Harrabin et al. 2003) 
 
1. What exactly is the risk? How big is it? Who does it affect? 
2.  How has the risk been measured? How big is the sample? Who funded 
the research? How reputable is the source? 
3. If you are reporting a relative risk, have you made clear what the baseline 
risk is (for example a 100 percent increase in the problem that affects one 
person in 2000 will still only affect one in 1000)? 
4. Have you asked how safe is this rather than is this safe? 
5. If a scientist or a victim is taking a view that runs against majority 
scientific opinion, is that clear in the report and in the casting of the 
discussion and subsequent questions? 
6. Have you told the audience how to find more information? 
7. Can you find a comparison to make the risk easier to understand? 
8. Have you given the audience information to put the risk in contest (for 
example with regard to risk-risk tradeoffs)? 
9. Is the scale of reporting in proportion to the extent of the risk? Will our 
reporting increase or decrease risks in society? 
10. Can we use a story about a specific risk as a springboard to discuss other 
related risks? (Perhaps less applicable in the case of EFSA)   
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This review finds much to commend EFSA in their approach to risk communication. 
It is suggested that official actions by the Authority surrounding the cases observed 
are indicative of a „sea-change‟ in organisational thinking and regulatory practices in 
Europe concerning the development of risk communication relating to food and feed 
safety since earlier European food scandals such as BSE and the Belgian dioxin scare. 
EFSA started predominantly well in addressing some very difficult risk 
communication problems and where there have been setbacks (for example in initially 
being reactive instead of proactive on the issue of GMOs) the Authority has made a 
great deal of progress to address shortfalls. Indeed, EFSA has not stood still in its 
attempts to assert itself as a reputable source of information on food risk and safety 
throughout Europe. It is the opinion of this review that if EFSA should continue to 
strive for excellence with as much commitment and dedication as it has shown so far 
that it will continue to make good progress in becoming a trusted, reliable and 
authoritative advisory for citizens and consumers, NGOs, the media, industry, the 
European Commission, Member States and other stakeholders alike. The 
recommendations which follow are therefore put forward with the aim of helping 
EFSA to continue to meet that goal. 
 
7. Review Recommendations 
 
Overall with the notable exception of early communications on GMOs, EFSA 
performed well, generally meeting the technical appraisal criteria set out by the 
review. There are however some key areas where EFSA could make important 
improvements and also some ways in which to invigorate the Authority‟s efforts to 
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ensure risk communications fulfil all the duties within EFSA‟s remit. In particular it is 
suggested that EFSA could be more mindful of the communication needs of the 
general public who are often ultimately the recipients of communications relayed by 
intermediaries.    
 
- EFSA could supplement present risk communication strategies and plans 
by developing more fine-grained formal internal protocols on reporting 
risks with regard to the type of decision relevant information that should 
be included in communications to help ensure message quality and 
consistency in delivery across different food risk areas. The AGRC could 
help advise on the content of these protocols. 
 
- EFSA should also consider having food risk communications materials, 
including official Opinions, peer-reviewed in addition to other scientific 
experts and Expert Panel members. A more extended peer-review process 
will help contribute to quality, consistency and decision relevance of messages 
by broadening the expertise (including behavioural science and psychology for 
example) which informs EFSA‟s risk communications.  
 
- EFSA is reliant on intermediaries to relay their communications and so 
should work with the “influencers” such as members of the press, 
consumer groups and national food safety authorities to ensure that risk 
communications are underpinned by a science-based approach. EFSA 
may wish to consider holding an open workshop and/or consultation on media 
and risk communication supported by psychologists, decision and behavioural 
scientists to help develop criteria to assist the reporting of risk such as those 
currently employed by the BBC noted above. An outcome of this type of 
initiative might be to provide a document with the decision relevant 
requirements of consumers in mind to be hosted on EFSA website so that it 
could be used as a reference by all the various stakeholders reporting food 
risks. It is recognised that whilst it may not be an easy task to involve all 
stakeholders in such an initiative, and indeed if improperly handled members 
of the media could perceive this to be overstepping the mark, EFSA could start 
this process as a way of fostering a critical dialogue between stakeholders on 
this important issue.  
 
- EFSA should further consider the extent of its role in ascertaining the 
impact of risk communications, particularly where the Authority’s 
communications cross over into or interact with risk management or 
comment on risk management options. Whilst EFSA is not mandated to 
undertake responsibility for risk management of food health risks, risk 
management concerns are often inherent to both risk assessment and risk 
communication and therefore need to be more explicitly acknowledged and 
accounted for in EFSA‟s actions.  The Authority could for example work more 
closely with stakeholders such as national food safety authorities, consumer 
organisations and industry where for example messages are seen to be aimed 
at targeting vulnerable groups (as was the case with semicarbazide and 
SWAFF) to more actively monitor the impact of communications on public 
understanding and behaviour. At present the Authority is well equipped to 
monitor the media impact of communications but some other forms of 
evaluation of risk communication messages involving members the general 
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public would also be most beneficial and may be a topic to consider for future 
reviews. Public responses to risk issues raised by EFSA do after all constitute 
an important measure of the Authority‟s impact.  Such work would provide a 
useful supplement to initiatives such as the Eurobarometer on Risk Issues that 
was carried out by EFSA/SANCO. 
 
- EFSA has made good progress and should continue to impress upon its 
members the need to ensure it maintains a proactive approach to risk 
communications on the issue of GMOs and for any emerging risks where 
there is high social ambiguity and political controversy to ensure against 
communication vacuums.  We recognise that given the political aspects the 
GMO case is a particularly difficult risk communication issue for any official 
authority, and probably more so in many respects than the other cases analysed 
in this review in light of special interest group activity and public interest 
within Europe. It is advised that EFSA should remain vigilant of the potential 
social and political ramifications that come to light for all emerging food risks 
that come within its remit as well as scientific considerations to help the 
Authority to engage proactively in its communications.     
 
- EFSA should pay especial attention to the formulation of risk 
communications underpinned by high levels of uncertainty and work 
closely with institutional actors within the EC such as DG SANCO to 
ensure consistency in communications at the pan-European level.  So far 
the Authority has acted well in collaboration with risk managers by 
recognising and mitigating some of the communication pitfalls associated with 
both issuing scientific advice and adopting risk management measures under 
high levels of uncertainty, such as substitution dangers (or „risk-risk‟ 
tradeoffs) which may arise for example when precautionary actions are 
undertaken. EFSA should continue to be mindful of such issues in its 
communications to help promote informed choices. However, it should be 
noted that consistency of communications messages between Member States 
and EFSA may not always necessarily be desirable or possible due to national 
and cultural variations in the demand for different types of information as seen 
in the case of the UK FSA and the semicarbazide case.  
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